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This dissertation is comprised of three essays that focus on under-explored impacts
of taxation, including how it influences the behavior of individuals, the interaction
between firms and workers, and the economy as a whole. In the three essays, I test
theoretical predictions through empirical analyses from both a micro and a macro
perspective, using disparate methodologies as required by the disparate problems I
address.
The first essay examines the Savers Credit, which is a tax credit given to low
and middle income households for contributing to a retirement savings plan. The
policy is structured such that reporting one extra dollar of income could lead to
large loss in credit, giving individuals incentive to not report that last dollar. This
discontinuity allows for a clear analysis of the behavior of taxpayers near the notch.
I assess the distortion resulting from the policys incentive structure gauged through
misreported income and I test whether the policy was effective in achieving its goal of
increasing retirement contributions. I find that individuals indeed responded to the
policy’s unintended incentive to misreport income, but failed to increase retirement
contributions on the margin.
The second essay, which is co-written with Matthew Rutledge, analyzes whether
1
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changes made to marginal tax rates on personal income affect pre-tax wage rates.
Past literature often assumes that pre-tax wage rates are unchanged by a tax policy
change. We formally test this assumption by focusing on the Tax Reform Act of
1986, which, most notably, made large changes to the personal income tax. Using
survey data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to follow
individuals and their employment history, we find that changes in net-of-tax rates
are negatively associated with pre-tax wage rates. Our empirical analysis explores
how taxes can affect the wage rates offered to workers, and fails to support the claim
that pre-tax wage rates are invariant to changes in marginal tax rates.
The third essay, which is co-written with Brendan Epstein, studies the role that
taxes play in determining labor hours across countries. Past studies have explained
differences in labor hours per population for a broad set of OECD countries by
looking at differences in effective tax rates; our study provides additional insight on
this topic by also accounting for employment changes that took place over the past
40 years. In particular, we show that the standard neoclassical model with taxes is a
better predictor of hours per worker due to its inability to capture hours changes on
the extensive margin. We then develop a model that allows both hours per worker
and employment per population to vary. We find that our model accounts for a
larger fraction of aggregate data on hours per worker than the standard neoclassical
model with taxes. Thus the impact that taxes have on individuals’ decisions to work
can be better understood at an aggregate level when the hours decision is separated
into an intensive and an extensive margin.
As a whole this dissertation explores behavioral responses to assess the impact
resulting from tax policy. In the first two essays I study specific tax policies to
gain a better understanding of broader public finance topics, including the impact
3
of non-linear budget sets and the incidence of a tax on personal income. The third
essay lies at the intersection of public finance and macroeconomics and analyzes tax
policy more generally in an international setting. This dissertation contributes to
both public finance and macroeconomic literature by helping to better understand
the specific impacts of taxation on micro- and macroeconomic decisions.
CHAPTER II
Taxpayers’ Response to Notches:
Evidence from the Saver’s Credit
2.1 Introduction
When tax incentives are used to motivate a desired behavior, they often induce
unintended responses in the process. The Saver’s Credit, a non-refundable tax credit
given to low and middle income households for making retirement contributions, is
no exception. Although the credit is meant to subsidize retirement savings, its design
also effectively subsidizes people to adjust their income.1 This paper analyzes the
overall impact of the Saver’s Credit by examining the consequences of this policy,
both intended and unintended.
The goal of the Saver’s Credit is to encourage retirement savings among low and
middle income households (Gale et al. (2005)), yet its structure allows for some to
lose as much as $600 in credit by earning one extra dollar of income. To provide
the largest benefit for those with the lowest incomes, the amount of credit falls
discontinuously as adjusted gross income (AGI) increases for a given amount of
savings. The resulting discontinuity, or “notch,” in an individual’s budget constraint
fosters a strong incentive to forego that extra dollar of income, either by altering labor
supply or by misreporting income. While this is similar to the incentives created by
1This adjustment to the income need not be illegal.
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the nonlinearities in the personal income tax, the personal income tax merely creates
kinks or changes to the slope of the budget line not the shifts associated with a notch.
Thus, the Saver’s Credit policy provides households an even stronger reason to report
taxable income just below the notch, which could manifest in the income distribution
as bunching, or a number of individuals grouping their incomes just below the notch.
This paper exploits the discontinuous structure of the Saver’s Credit to investigate
two questions: conditional on receiving the Saver’s Credit, do households adjust
their income in order to receive a higher credit rate? and: do households that
receive a higher credit save more? Because households with higher savings have a
stronger incentive to manipulate their income and bunch at the notch, bunching
has implications for savings behavior. Thus, I start by examining whether bunching
exists among people who filed for the Saver’s Credit. If bunching is found, then people
who report incomes below the notch to receive a higher credit rate may also have
higher marginal propensities to save. For instance, an individual that has a strong
preference for saving and thus saved the maximum amount, also has an increased
incentive to bunch as she has the most to gain from a higher credit rate. This makes
disentangling the policy’s influence on savings contributions difficult. In particular, if
the higher credit rate is associated with higher levels of savings, then determining the
motivating factor for the change in savings will be difficult. If bunching is found with
no increase in the level of savings contributions, then the policy is simply providing
an incentive for people to report income below the notch. If no bunching is found,
then an increase in savings signals the program effectively encouraged behavior for
the marginal person without the unintended consequences.
To analyze how households respond to the Saver’s Credit, I use the IRS Statistics
of Income (SOI) Individual Public Use Tax Files spanning 2002 through 2004. The
6
data contain information obtained directly from individual tax returns, which I use
to estimate the effects of the Saver’s Credit. I conduct a formal test for bunching by
adapting a technique developed by McCrary (2008) and find evidence that bunching
exists. Further inspection of the results reveals that, although a significant break
exists in the pooled sample, the 2003 data appear to be driving the results. This
result is puzzling, as the credit’s effect on bunching appears to lessen over time,
whereas intuitively one might expect the bunching to increase over time as people
learn about and adapt behavior in response to the notch.
It may be the case that competing programs also influence the behavior of the
targeted population. Thus, I consider the confounding effects of additional federal
programs, each with its own set of incentives, aimed at the same demographic. The
largest anti-poverty program targeted at potential recipients of the Saver’s Credit
is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); those accepting the EITC credit may be
reacting to an alternative set of incentives, thereby confounding the bunching results.
After excluding EITC recipients from the sample, the magnitude and significance of
the break increases over time, consistent with people learning.
The nature of the program makes the regression discontinuity research design
seem ideal for studying the effect of the credit rate changes on savings contribution
levels. However, the bunching complicates these estimates by potentially violating
the identification assumption necessary for estimation. Although bunching is found
in the data, I place bounds on the estimated treatment effect, following Lee (2002),
which account for the potential resulting bias. Conditional on taking the Saver’s
Credit, I find no significant evidence that receiving a higher credit rate increased
individual savings contributions for the marginal person. The overall impact of the
Saver’s Credit appears to be that taxpayers taking the Saver’s Credit understand
7
and respond to the incentive to bunch at the notch but their savings contributions
are unresponsive to the change in its price.
2.2 The Saver’s Credit
The Saver’s Credit targets households who earn below a threshold income level,
where the income level is determined by filing status.2 Individuals may receive a
non-refundable tax credit on retirement contributions of up to $2,000 made to both
traditional and Roth IRA plans as well as elective deferrals plans such as 401(k) and
403(b) plans.3 Because the credit is non-refundable, individuals must have positive
tax liability to receive a Saver’s Credit. Details regarding the credit rates for the
Saver’s Credit are presented in Table 2.1. The last row of Table 2.1 calculates the
equivalent match rate by interpreting the Saver’s Credit like an employer match on
elective deferrals.4 For example, a taxpayer who contributes $1 earns a $0.50 credit
that immediately offsets tax liability and puts $0.50 back in that taxpayer’s pocket.
That 50% credit rate has an economically equivalent match rate of 100%, since the
taxpayer and the government effectively each contribute $0.50. This calculation
allows for a comparison to studies on the success of employer matching as a savings
incentive, which I will draw from when discussing the impact of the Saver’s Credit
on retirement contributions.
Because the Saver’s Credit rate changes discontinuously with AGI (for a given
amount of savings), taxpayers face a discrete jump in their after-tax income at the
program’s income cutoffs. Suppose a single filer with a positive tax liability and an
AGI of $15,000 contributes $2,000 to a retirement plan. She will receive a tax credit
2After becoming permanent under the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the Saver’s Credit was indexed for inflation
causing the threshold income levels to rise from 2007 on.
3Couples that are married filing jointly can earn a credit on contributions up to $4,000.
4This follows Duflo et al. (2006) and Gale et al. (2005) who compare the Saver’s Credit to employer matching on
contributions to a company retirement plan where the credit rate, s, is equivalent to an employer match rate of s
1−s .
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of $1,000, or 50% of her savings contribution to offset her tax liability. However, if she
makes one extra dollar of income, her credit rate falls from 50% to 20%. Since each
dollar of her contribution now earns the lower credit rate, her total credit will then
fall from $1,000 to $400, forming a $600 notch in her budget constraint. Figure 2.1
illustrates the specific notches that result from the Saver’s Credit seen in the before-
and after-tax budget constraint for a married couple filing jointly. The couple’s
budget constraint with the Saver’s Credit policy maintains the same slope, but at
the income cutoffs, the couple faces downward jumps in their after-tax income for a
fixed retirement contribution. Thus, moving from an income of $30,000 to $30,001
strictly lowers utility.
Given the complexity of the Saver’s Credit, there is evidence that the credit has a
low take-up rate. Between 2002 and 2006, roughly 5.3 million credits were filed each
year and the average credit payment was around $190. Following the first year the
credit was offered, Koenig and Harvey (2005) found that 34% of eligible taxpayers
failed to claim up to $496 million dollars in credits, and 43% of claimed credits were
limited by tax liability. This low participation rate is even more staggering in light of
Gale et al. (2005) who note that the Saver’s Credit complements employer matching,
making the effective match rate as high as 200% for a 50% employer match rate.
Table 2.2 gives a detailed summary of aggregate participation rates by AGI for the
Saver’s Credit, as well as the average credit amounts.
There is a small but growing literature that looks specifically at the Saver’s Credit.
Koenig and Harvey (2005) study the Saver’s Credit following its first year in existence
and conclude that the credit’s non-refundability is a limiting factor for eligibility.
Also, the lack of knowledge for the credit substantially decreased the number of
credits claimed. Gale et al. (2005) provide a general discussion of the Saver’s Credit
9
and suggest possible ways to improve the credit as a policy tool for encouraging
retirement savings among low and middle income households. These studies offer
descriptive analyses of the Saver’s Credit, which I expand upon by examining not
only the incentive to save but the incentive to alter income in order to avoid a credit
loss at the notch.
2.3 Related Literature
The bunching incentives of the Saver’s Credit are not unique; the US tax code cre-
ates similar incentives by imposing kinks and notches within a household’s budget
constraint. Whereas a notch creates a discontinuous jump within a budget con-
straint, a kink creates a slope change. Although theory predicts bunching in both
cases, the incentive to bunch is stronger in the case of a notch. Past literature has
looked at whether people respond to kinks within a budget constraint by bunching
reported income. Saez (2009) finds very little bunching of AGI at the kinks created
by the personal income tax, but finds that bunching exists at the first kink of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) among self-employed individuals. This bunching
disappears for those who are not self-employed, which may indicate that people who
have more control over their income and/or reporting of income are more likely to
bunch. Chetty (2009a) posits that the lack of consistent bunching in the data may
be the result of optimization error. If individuals face some cost to adjusting their
income to bunch, then depending on the size of the economic incentive, this cost
may not be recouped by the benefit of reoptimizing. This also suggests that for size-
able economic incentives, such as those created by large kinks or notches, bunching
may be found in the data more regularly. Chetty et al. (2009) incorporate potential
frictions in optimizing and find bunching of income at large and salient kinks in the
10
Danish tax code, but find very little evidence for bunching at the smaller, less salient
kinks. The Saver’s Credit introduces a notch, which creates a large economic incen-
tive to bunch. However, this bunching could be mitigated through issues of salience
and income control, which will ultimately impact whether and how much bunching
appears in the data.
Of particular interest to the questions explored in this paper are the papers by
Duflo et al. (2006) and Duflo et al. (2007). Duflo et al. (2006) conduct an experi-
mental program with incentives similar to the Saver’s Credit to analyze the impact
of offering a match for retirement contributions on participating in retirement sav-
ings plans. The study focuses particularly on participation in Express IRA (X-IRA)
plans by H&R Block clients. X-IRAs are IRAs that can be opened at the time of
filing using the tax refund earned on that filing. In the experiment, match rates of
0%, 20%, and 50% for IRA contributions are randomly assigned to taxpayers filing
at H&R Block. The authors estimate when the match rate is increased from 20%
to 50%, participation in X-IRA plans increases by 6.4%, while retirement contribu-
tions increase by $310, conditional on take-up. These experimental results are then
compared to quasi-experimental results obtained on the Saver’s Credit. The Saver’s
Credit effectively offers match rates of 0%, 11%, 25%, and 100%, though these rates
are not randomly assigned. Using a difference-in-difference approach, where those
who are ineligible for the Saver’s Credit act as a comparison group, the authors
estimate that increasing the effective match rate increases participation in X-IRA
plans by 1.3% and, conditional on take-up, increases retirement contributions by
$81. Duflo et al. (2006) find that the experimental results are more pronounced than
the Saver’s Credit in terms of participation and savings contributions. In a separate
study, Duflo et al. (2007) use data from H&R Block to study these differences in the
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household response.
Both Duflo et al. (2006) and Duflo et al. (2007) observe a spike in the histogram
of X-IRA participation at the location of the first notch in the Saver’s Credit. Given
that the benefit to opening an account is constant in the range of the 50% credit
rate, there is no reason to expect a spike at the first notch in participation unless
people are bunching to avoid the credit loss. This paper will provide a direct test
for whether this bunching exists in the density of AGI along with an estimate for
the amount of bunching that took place. By using representative data, this paper
will also generate more generalizable estimates of the Saver’s Credit’s impacts on the
individuals it seeks to affect.
In my empirical study, I focus my analysis on individuals who take the Saver’s
Credit to determine how the structure of the credit influences their behavior. Those
that file for the credit are arguably more informed about the Saver’s Credit’s struc-
ture and incentives than those that do not file for the credit. This generates a number
of questions. Are people who take the credit able to fully optimize their credit rate
by altering their reported income? If differing credit rates are known ahead of time,
do they have any impact on savings contributions? In order to motivate the empir-
ical estimation, I start with a theoretical model that generates specific behavioral
predictions arising from the Saver’s Credit.
2.4 Theory
2.4.1 Exogenous Income
The incentive structure of the Saver’s Credit can be modeled in a two-period
framework. I start with a standard intertemporal budget constraint where the agent
lives for two periods and maximizes utility over consumption, given by U(c1, c2). In
the first period the agent inelastically supplies labor and thus earns an exogenous
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income, y. The agent chooses how much to save, a, and how much to consume, c1, in
period 1. For simplicity, I assume the only means of savings is through a retirement
plan and thus I use the terms savings and retirement contributions interchangeably.5
The policy dictates for a given amount of savings less than Ā, the government will
provide a credit equal to a proportion, s, of the agent’s savings, where s depends on
income. For any savings contribution above Ā, the agent simply receives sĀ and the
amount of savings no longer impacts the amount of the total credit. For simplicity,
the marginal tax rate on income, τ > 0, is assumed to be constant. The first period
budget constraint is given by: for a < Ā,
y(1− τ) + s(y)a = c1 + a,
and for a ≥ Ā,
y(1− τ) + s(y)Ā = c1 + a,
where s(y) =

.5 if 0 < y ≤ Ya
.2 if Ya < y ≤ Yb
.1 if Yb < y ≤ Yc
0 if y > Yc.
In the second period, the agent consumes her savings plus the interest earned
from the first period. The second period budget constraint is given by,
c2 = a(1 + r).
Substituting for savings, the intertemporal budget constraint is: for a < Ā




and for a ≥ Ā




5For simplicity this set up does not allow for retirement contributions to be tax deductible, which would lower
taxable income and tax liability.
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For a < Ā, the price of consumption in period 2 falls to 1−s(y)
1+r
, while for a ≥ Ā,
the price of consumption in period 2 remains 1
1+r
– the same price as in the case of
no credit. Thus, for those who save a ≥ Ā, the credit creates an income effect but no
substitution effect. When labor is exogenous or inflexible over the range 0 ≤ y ≤ Y3,
the credit rate is also exogenous since the agent has no control over y. However, the
credit changes the price of saving, and increases overall income.
If consumption is a normal good, then the income effect from the credit should lead
to increased consumption in period 1, which decreases savings. However, because
the price of second period consumption falls from the credit, the substitution effect
would lower period 1 consumption, thereby increasing savings. Thus, by lowering the
price of consumption in the second period, the credit may increase savings depending
on how the income and substitution effects interact. In the empirical section of this
paper, I will test whether retirement contributions were indeed impacted by the
Saver’s Credit and in what direction.
2.4.2 Endogenous Income and Income Reports
Next, I relax the exogenous labor income assumption, and incorporate the agent’s
choice between labor and leisure, where labor hours is denoted as l. The agent must
choose the number of hours to work in period 1, for a given wage rate, w. Income,
y, is calculated as
y = wl.
Because the proportion of savings returned to the agent as a credit depends on
income, the incentive to earn an extra dollar is distorted at the income cutoffs for
differing credit rates. As a result, there is an incentive to either forego the extra dollar
of earned income or, if possible, to misreport income. I therefore extend the model to
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include the possibility that individuals have an incentive to alter their income report
through a choice variable, x, where x is unreported income.6 The agent’s reported
income, yR, now differs from her earned income, y, so that
yR = y − x.
The savings credit and taxes will now both depend on yR rather than y and the new
intertemporal budget constraint is, For a < Ā






and for a ≥ Ā




The optimal reported income, if there were no cost to misreporting income would
be trivial and anyone with savings would report y ≤ y1. However, misreporting
carries a risk. Following Slemrod (2001), I include a cost to misreporting income
denoted by φ(x,wl), where φx(x,wl) > 0 and φl(x,wl) < 0. An individual-specific
parameter, γ, where 0 < γ ≤ 1, multiplies this cost function to represent idiosyncratic
costs of misreporting. For example, a low value of γ indicates the individual has a
low cost for misreporting income as in the case of self-employment. On the other
hand, a high value of γ indicates income that is difficult to misreport such as when
income is predominately earned through wages and salary, which are also reported
by employers.
Agents are endowed with a fixed amount of time, L̄, that is allocated to either
labor hours or to leisure. The utility function is expanded so that the agent derives
utility from leisure. The agent’s problem is to choose c1, c2, l and x to maximize






U(c1, c2, L̄− l)
subject to their intertemporal budget constraint: for a < Ā
wl(1− τ) + τx+ s(yR) c2
1 + r
− γφ(x,wl) = c1 +
c2
1 + r
and for a ≥ Ā




Because the schedule of rates for the Saver’s Credit is discontinuous, notches are
formed in the budget constraint. Thus, the maximization problem is solved for each
income range and the agent chooses the bundle that gives the most overall utility.
Given standard assumptions for the utility function, bunching will occur by some
individuals at the notches. An individual will bunch as long as the cost of lowering
their income report or their labor hours will be regained by the benefit from receiving
a higher credit rate on their savings. Let x∗ denote the unique amount of misreported
income that positions an individual’s income report at a notch. Each person faces a
benefit and a cost to misreporting income where the marginal cost of misreporting is
equal to γφx(.), and differs across individuals. In some situations, a person will not
misreport to x∗ because the amount of optimal misreported income is either greater
than the amount it takes to reach the notch, or the benefit from the credit does not
cover the additional cost of the extra misreported income. This group will report
yR > y − x∗. For some, however, the extra benefit that comes from misreporting
x∗ at the notch, may raise them beyond the cost of misreporting. Accordingly, this
group will report yR ≤ y−x∗, which will include people that optimally bunch at the
notch.
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An individual can bunch either by changing their labor supply or by changing
their income report and both actions are associated with costs and benefits. For
the purpose of intuition only, I assume that s(yR) is a continuously differentiable














− λw[1− τ + s′(yR)ψ(a)− γφl(.)] = 0





if a < Ā
Ā if a ≥ Ā.








) = w[1− τ + s′(yR)ψ(a)− γφl(.)]. (2.1)
The expressions within the brackets can be broken down into two parts. Recall that
s′(yR) < 0, and φl < 0. Then s
′(yR) is interpreted as the decrease in benefit from
working an additional hour due to the decrease in credit rate. On the other hand,
φl can be interpreted as the increase in the benefit of working an additional hour
that comes from lowering the cost of misreporting income. Thus the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor is equal to the net benefit from working
an additional hour, taking into account the reduced credit rate and reduced cost to
misreporting.
The first order condition for x is given by:
λ[τ − s′(yR)ψ(a)− γφx(.)] = 0. (2.2)
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This condition shows that the agent has an incentive to misreport income since
increasing x by $1 will reduce tax liability by τ . Also, x increases the credit rate
by lowering yR. The optimal amount of misreported income is that which sets the
marginal cost of misreporting income, measured as φx, equal to the marginal benefit
of increasing x, measured as τ − s′(yR)ψ(a), where the change in credit rate is scaled
by the amount of savings.
A certain amount of time and learning must be invested in order to claim the
credit. However, beyond just knowing the credit exists an additional investment
must be made to understand how it works. This information cost is excluded from
the model but could prove to be an important factor for my empirical results. By
ignoring the complexity of the program, I may find that agents base their actions on
a slightly different problem which comes from this lack of understanding. This would
impact whether bunching and savings behavior respond to the credit as predicted
and thus poses a concern for the empirical estimation.
Two predictions emerge from the theory presented above: (1) people will bunch at
the notch and (2) savings contributions are influenced by the offer of a credit, though
the direction is ambiguous because of income and substitution effects. Whether these
predictions appear in the data will be influenced by other factors. Starting with the
former, the amount of bunching is affected by a number of additional factors, includ-
ing the distribution of cost functions for misreported income among the population.
The latter hypothesis is impacted by the distribution of preferences for saving along
with differences in people’s ability and propensity to save. These predictions on the
potential behavioral responses of the Saver’s Credit form the basis for the empirical
section that follows.
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2.5 Data Description and Summary Statistics
The Individual Public Use Tax Files are an annual cross-section of tax returns
spanning 1960 to 2004, available at the Statistics Division of the Internal Revenue
Service. The 2002 through 2004 data contain dollar amounts for all Saver’s Cred-
its filed during that period. After dropping observations pertaining to previous tax
years, each sample represents roughly 127 million tax returns. Data are obtained
through stratified probability sampling where each stratum is defined by a combi-
nation of AGI and the presence of particular tax forms. Sampling rates within each
stratum range from 0.05% to 100%.7 The Public Use Tax File over-samples wealthy
individuals to achieve a broad range of tax rates in the data. Unfortunately, this
limits the number of returns in the sample from low and middle income households.
In particular, this greatly reduces returns that are both eligible for, and filed for
the Saver’s Credit. There are 7,718 returns in the combined sample of taxpayers
claiming the Saver’s Credit between 2002 and 2004 representing roughly 5.1 million
claims in the population.
I calculate savings contributions to retirement plans using the amount of credit
claimed on a tax return and dividing by the eligible credit rate. Because the credit
is non-refundable, this calculation is bounded by total tax liability less additional
credits that include the foreign tax credit, child care credit, elderly credit, and ed-
ucation credit. Those who fall in the 50% credit rate are more likely to reach this
bound as they typically have the lowest tax liability. In the sample, roughly 52% of
people receiving the 50% credit rate are at their credit limit. Overall, those with a
Saver’s Credit equivalent to the tax limit account for 15% of all Saver’s Credit filers.
Similar to Duflo et al. (2006), I combine all taxpayers by normalizing AGI to
7A more complete description of the data can be found at http://www.nber.org/ taxsim/gdb/.
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align the notch for each filing status to match married couples filing jointly. This
entails multiplying single filers’ AGI by 2, and head of households’ AGI by 4/3. In
addition, the 20% credit falls within a narrow income band, between $1,250 to $2,500,
depending on income status; thus, I group those receiving the 10% credit rate and
20% credit rates. This creates one “Saver’s Credit notch”, marking the jump from
receiving a “high” credit rate of 50% to receiving a “low” credit rate of 10% or 20%.
Because the Saver’s Credit is targeted at low and middle income households,
some individuals may be credit constrained, raising a question as to their ability to
save for retirement. Table 2.3 shows participation in retirement plans by taxpayers
that have a positive AGI below $25,000 and a positive AGI below $50,000. These
aggregate data are unable to control for filing status or tax liability, but nonetheless
show the existence of low and middle income household savers. Another concern
arising from the lower end of the income distribution is the ability to control income.
Underlying the theoretical prediction of bunching is the assumption that people have
some control over reported income through labor supply or misreporting. The extent
to which households have control over their income is therefore an important factor
that will impact the results on bunching.8 As a proxy for income control, Table
2.4 provides additional summary statistics on how Saver’s Credit filers compare to
eligible (based on their AGI) taxpayers that did not claim the Saver’s Credit in
terms of the types of income they report. The “eligible” group contains people that
fall below the appropriate income limits and have positive tax liability. Because
savings data are unavailable for people who did not take the credit, the eligible
group will overstate the actual number of people eligible for the Saver’s Credit by
including those who did not contribute to a qualified retirement plan; however, this
8Saez (2009),Chetty et al. (2009) and others have estimated behavorial elasticities based on the amount of bunching
induced by non-linearities within a budget constraint.
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group can still serve as a useful comparison for Saver’s Credit filers. Table 2.4 shows
that Saver’s Credit takers typically have more schedule income, which potentially
indicates a lower cost to manipulating income. Additional summary statistics show
that mean tax liability is greater for people who filed for the credit, consistent with
a binding nonrefundability constraint.
In Table 2.5, I present probit results looking at the factors affecting the probability
of taking the credit conditional on eligibility as defined in the paragraph above.
Factors including e-filing and having a paid preparer increase the likelihood of take-
up. The results show that having a higher credit is not associated with higher take-
up, which is expected given that the credit rate is not randomly assigned. However,
past studies, including the experimental results from Duflo et al. (2006), show that
offering higher matches increases participation. For the empirical portion of this
paper, I focus my analysis on those who take the Saver’s Credit, and draw inference
based on comparisons between the groups receiving different credit treatment. I start
by analyzing whether people bunch their incomes at the notch, and then move on to
look at the relative savings contributions within the groups.
2.6 Bunching
Since the credit’s eligibility rules are known ahead of time and AGI is self-reported,
taxpayers may report AGI just below the notch so as to benefit from the higher credit
rate. As shown in Section 3.3, taxpayers can decrease labor hours so their income
falls below the notch, or they can alter their income.9 For the purpose of this paper,
I will not distinguish between the two behaviors. Instead, I focus only on whether
there exists bunching in the estimated density of AGI, as its existence is instructive
9According to Feldstein (1999), the welfare cost from imposing a tax can be measured simply by knowing the
response in taxable income, not the mechanism of response. However, Chetty (2009b) disputes this. See Saez et al.
(2009) for a critical survey.
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for the welfare implications of the Saver’s Credit. However, I will provide evidence
that suggests income manipulation may be the mechanism filers use to bunch.
If people bunch, then a spike would appear in the density of AGI just below the
notch. Figure 2.2 shows the kernel density estimate of AGI for 2002-2004, using
Silverman’s plug-in described in Cameron and Trivedi (2005) as a guide for choosing
a bandwidth.10 The histogram of the data shows a small spike in AGI at the notch,
though the spike disappears in the kernel density plot. Figure 2.3 imposes a smaller
bandwidth as a robustness check, but yields no substantial evidence that bunching
exists in the kernel density estimated AGI density. Although the kernel density
graphs provide a helpful first pass of the data, they are of limited use in identifying
bunching since point estimates at the notch are obtained using observations on both
sides of the notch. If bunching exists, then the density to right of the notch is
inherently lower as people shift to the left. The kernel density estimate at the notch
will mask all but the most extreme signs of bunching as the density will be averaged
downward by observations from the right. Additionally, the histogram appears to
provide evidence of bunching that the kernel density smooths over. This warrants a
more formal test for a break in the density.
McCrary (2008) develops a test for detecting manipulation of a running variable–
the variable a policy rule is based on–in the context of regression discontinuity (RD)
estimation. For example, receiving a scholarship might be contingent on applicants
scoring above a certain threshold on their SAT, making SAT score the running vari-
able. When people have the power to affect the running variable, say through self-
reporting, and the policy rule is known ahead of time, they may manipulate the
running variable to ensure treatment. This is exactly the case for the Saver’s Credit
10Silverman’s plug-in is optimal for the normal kernel. I use the Epanechenikov kernel; however, the results do not
change by kernel choice.
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where AGI is the running variable. Assuming the distribution of AGI would be
continuous absent the policy, a break in the estimated density at the notch would
indicate manipulation of AGI took place. McCrary (2008) develops a formal test
for such a break by essentially estimating whether a break exists in the estimated
density of the running variable at the discontinuity from the policy. Intuitively, the
test estimates the treatment effect of the policy on the density of the running vari-
able. A point estimate is obtained for the behavioral response, which gives a sense
of its magnitude. For the application of an RD design, bunching in the running
variable has the potential to be problematic as it may lead to biased estimates of the
treatment effect. However, in this paper, bunching is an object of interest, serving
as evidence for a behavioral response to the policy.
After combining taxpayers so the notch is the same for each filing status, I define
the running variable as the newly aligned (or “normalized”) AGI. The test for bunch-
ing in the density of AGI proceeds as follows: first, an undersmoothed histogram is
created where no one bin contains points both to the left and to the right of the
break; second, local linear regression is used to smooth the histogram and provide an
estimate of the density of AGI.11 These steps are illustrated in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
Once each point is estimated, the estimated density graph provides visual evidence
for whether a break exists in the data. The test statistic of the break is derived by
taking the log difference in density of AGI at the notch, given by
θ̂ = ln f̂+ − ln f̂−. (2.3)
This measures the difference in the density at the notch when the density is estimated
separately with points to the left and points to the right of the notch. The null
11The binsize for the histogram is a function of the standard deviation of AGI. The estimated density is derived
using triangle kernel weights for the local linear smoothing, however, the results are robust to different kernel choices.
See McCrary (2008) for more details.
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hypothesis is that θ̂ is zero at the notch, which indicates no bunching occurred.
Therefore, a significant negative estimate for θ̂ implies that a large enough number
of taxpayers are at or closely below the notch to suggest that some manipulated their
AGI in order to receive the higher credit.
Figure 2.6 shows the graphical result of the test, effectively a pdf of AGI with 95%
confidence intervals derived using points to the left of the break and points to the
right of the break separately. Table 2.6 gives the numeric results from the break test
and indicates a significant break in the distribution of AGI exists.12 The coefficient
for θ̂ shows that the log difference in density to the left of the notch is 27% higher
than the estimated density to the right of the notch.
It is important to note the performance of θ̂ as an estimator is sensitive to the
size of the bandwidth. To choose a bandwidth, I use the automated bandwidth
selection process suggested by McCrary (2008). The procedure involves first binning
the data into a histogram, then fitting a global 4th order polynomial on each side
of the break, where the independent variable is defined by the midpoint of the bins
from the histogram. The estimated second derivative is then used to calculate the
rule-of-thumb bandwidth selector from Fan and Gijbels (1996) on each side of the
break. These two bandwidth choices are then averaged to obtain one bandwidth to
be used in the estimation process. The intuition for the selection process is that
the size of the bandwidth should be inversely proportional to the curvature of the
estimated density.13 The result in Table 2.6 uses the automatic bandwidth described
above. Although this is a relatively large bandwidth, I perform the break test using
additional bandwidth values as a robustness check. The break remains significantly
different than zero even when substantially larger bandwidth choices are employed,
12I thank Brian Kovak for providing me with code to run this test.
13A more complete discussion for the bandwidth selection can be found in McCrary (2008) and Fan and Gijbels
(1996)
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shown in Table 2.7. As expected, a smaller bandwidth of 3,500 reveals a larger break.
As an additional robustness check, I test for bunching at breaks other than $30,000.
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show that the breaks at values other than $30,000 are either not
statistically significant or are significant in the wrong direction.
The results from the test suggest that bunching took place in response to the
policy. As mentioned earlier, data limitations prohibit isolating the exact mecha-
nism for bunching. However, variation in the types of income reported can serve as
a proxy for one’s ability to manipulate their income. Looking at bunching behavior
broken down by type of income reported may provide suggestive evidence that ad-
justing income reports was used to bunch. Figure 2.9 graphs the AGI of individuals
who reported Schedule C income, while Figure 2.10 graphs the AGI of individuals
that did not report Schedule C income. The break is indeed larger for those with
Schedule C income, indicating that people with a presumably lower cost of misre-
porting their income comprise a larger proportion of bunchers. An additional test
looks at individuals who report only wage and salaried income, illustrated in Figure
2.11. The break in the density of AGI for these individuals is no longer significantly
different than zero. These graphs provide striking visual evidence, which indicates
some bunching occurred most likely by misreporting income. That individuals with
Schedule C income are more likely to bunch is inline with past studies on bunch-
ing. Saez (2009) finds evidence of bunching near to first kink of the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC). After parsing the sample by individuals with income from self-
employment and wage earners (those with no self-employment income), Saez finds
strong bunching only for the group with self-employment income. Similar results are
found in Chetty and Saez (2009), where information regarding the EITC schedule
was given to tax filers. More bunching was found for filers with self-employment
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income, though wage earners also responded to the EITC kink by bunching.
Given the possibility for optimization error as discussed in Chetty (2009a), I run
the break test separately by year to determine whether learning took place in terms
of people’s understanding of the notch’s incentives. In particular, one might expect
that over time the behavioral effect of the notch would become stronger in the sense
of more bunching taking place as people become more aware of the program and the
incentive to report income below the notch. Table 2.8 reveals the break found in the
density for the combined years is driven solely by 2003 data. In both 2002 and 2004,
the break is not significantly different than zero at a 95% confidence level, though
the break in 2002 is significant at the 90% confidence level. Given that 2002 was the
first year of the credit, it is not surprising that less bunching would occur compared
to later years. However, the results in 2004 pose somewhat of a puzzle, as it seems
unlikely that those who bunch in 2003 would stop bunching in 2004, unless the cost
to bunching grew between the two years. Table 2.8 shows that a Wald test of joint
equality between all three years is barely rejected at the 95% level, though 2004 is
rejected as being equal to 2002 and 2003 separately. Regardless, the point estimates
in all years remain negative, which still indicates a higher density to left of the notch.
I will address this puzzle by considering the impact of alternative incentives that may
dominate the Saver’s Credit’s incentives.
2.6.1 The Impact of the EITC
There are additional programs targeted at low and middle income households,
also creating distortions in the household budget constraint, that may confound an
attempt to identify the effect of the Saver’s Credit. In particular, the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) is aimed at the same demographic group and creates large kinks
in the marginal tax rate, but unlike the Saver’s Credit is refundable. The EITC
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incentives are structured so that some households are encouraged to work more and
others are encouraged to work less depending on their AGI and number of qualifying
children.14 Of importance to this paper is that people who claim both the EITC and
the Saver’s Credit may respond to the EITC incentives rather than the Saver’s Credit
notch. The EITC is a well-known and refundable credit, thus making its incentives
potentially more salient than the Saver’s Credit. This is particularly relevant as
those taking the EITC make up roughly 20% of the entire sample of Saver’s Credit
claims. Figures 2.15-2.17 present the same analysis as above but excluding the EITC
filers with the results for θ̂ excluding EITC filers summarized by Table 2.9.
The estimates show EITC claims indeed affected the amount of bunching in each
year, by increasing the bunching found in 2002 and 2003 and muting the bunching
found in 2004. In fact, after dropping individuals that take the EITC, there is
significant evidence of bunching in 2004.15 Once the EITC claims are accounted for,
a statistically significant break remains in 2003 as well. The breaks in AGI are both
larger in 2003 and 2004 than the break found in 2002, consistent with the hypothesis
that people learned and adapted to the incentives of the notch over time.
2.6.2 Discussion
For all Saver’s Credit claims and all years combined, the estimate for θ̂, the log
difference in the estimated density of AGI at the notch, is −0.263. This difference
implies 0.5% of the sample may be bunching. However, additional people may be
bunching, but not precisely at the notch. Thus, I offer a simple estimate of the
14The IRS has rules to define a “qualified child” where the child must meet all requirements for relationship, age,
and residency. More information can be found at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p596/ch02.html
15In June 2003, the IRS announced that it would conduct three new programs with one of the stated goals to
increases compliance of claims. One of these programs, the EITC Automated Underreporter (AUR) Study, was
created to address overclaims from misreported income by improving which claims the IRS flagged as high risk of
error. In 2004, the AUR was added to the base of compliance programs already in place (IRS 2008). This may have
made it more difficult to misreport income in 2004 compared to other years, forcing those who previously misreported
to move to the right of the notch.
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counter-factual density of AGI, where I leave out observations close to the notch and
instead interpolate those observations, as illustrated in Figure 2.18. By taking the
difference between the cumulative density including the bunchers and the cumulative
counterfactual density, I can estimate the proportion of individuals that bunch due
to the notch.
The estimated difference in cumulative density translates to roughly 0.75% of
all Saver’s Credit filers. In other words, this difference can represent up to 38,000
individuals bunched as a result of the policy. If bunchers save the maximum of $2,000,
then this would translate to government paid credits of $22.8 million.16 Given that
the overall program costs roughly one billion dollars each year, the additional cost
incurred by bunching may seem negligible, but this calculation does not include
the lost tax revenue from individuals who would have reported more absent the
program. While the lost revenue also would most likely be small relative to the
overall cost of the program (since the marginal tax rate on dollars earned near the
Saver’s Credit notch is low), the amount lost in tax revenue depends on the amount
of underreported income needed to reach the notch. So, although the Saver’s Credit
induces a behavioral response in bunching, the additional cost to the government of
this response is relatively small.
Given that bunching is found in the data, one would expect that those with
higher savings contributions also have a higher incentive to bunch. This is confirmed
in Section 3.3, where the benefit from misreporting that results from the increase in
credit rate is scaled by the amount of savings. Thus, a spike in savings contributions
should exist to the left of the notch as well. In the next section, I examine the
16Assuming all bunchers saved $2,000, the government would owe each of the 38,000 bunchers a $1000 credit
rather than a $400 credit, thus creating an additional cost of $22.8 million. This number is an upper bound due
contributions, on average, being less than $2000. But as bunchers theoretically are more likely save, this does provide
a rough estimate for the cost to the government.
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retirement contributions behavior around the notch further to see whether individuals
appear to be making higher contributions to the left of the notch.
2.7 Retirement Contributions
The Saver’s Credit is meant to stimulate retirement savings among low and mid-
dle income households. Thus, a complete assessment of households responses to the
Saver’s Credit includes observing any resulting changes made to retirement contri-
butions. The ability to make contributions is a function of income, where those who
earn more tend to have more disposable income with which to make contributions.
Looking at the average savings contributions by the high credit and lower income
filers versus the low credit and higher income filers would therefore generate biased
results. Instead, I exploit the discontinuity in the program and adopt a regression
discontinuity approach.
Because the notch is arbitrarily assigned by the government, I can isolate individ-
uals to the left and to the right of the notch to control for income effects on savings.
To identify the treatment effect of the higher credit rate, I must assume those to
the left and to the right of the notch are similar other than receiving different credit
rates. A concern with this procedure arises from the behavioral response to the
notch. If the bunching found in Section 2.6 is comprised of people who save more
and therefore have the most to gain from the higher credit rate, then the RD estimate
of the average treatment effect would be biased towards finding a positive effect of
the higher credit on savings contributions. In other words, the average treatment
effect would indicate people made larger contributions if they received a higher credit
rate, when in fact the positive estimate could simply be the result of selection bias.
However, because it is possible to sign the bias the result can be interpreted as a
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upper bound for the treatment effect. In addition, I use a procedure described below
to more formally place an upper and lower bound on the impact.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) I estimate the following equation where
the level of savings contributions, denoted by Ai, is given by
Ai = α + τDi + β0(Yi − c) + β1(Yi − c) ∗Di + εi, (2.4)
Di is an indicator for whether someone received the high credit rate, c is the cutoff
to receive a high credit, and Yi is AGI. Di depends on AGI, Yi, such that Di = 1[0 <
Yi ≤ c] and 0 otherwise, and c is the threshold level of adjusted gross income to
receive the high credit rate. The average treatment effect from receiving the high
credit as opposed to the low credit is estimated as τ . In the absence of bunching,
εi will be orthogonal to Di yielding a consistent estimate for τ . As noted above,
bunching has the potential to cause the orthogonality condition to be violated. For
now I will proceed with the caveat that the estimate τ may be biased due to the
selection; however, I will return to this issue and address the bias by placing bounds
on the true value.
Figure 2.19 shows the average savings contributions within bins of $200.17 No
visible change is apparent in savings behavior at the notch, which is confirmed by
the estimates of the treatment effect. These results are summarized in Table 2.10.
I fail to reject the null that the average treatment effect of receiving a high credit
rate is significantly different than zero. This says that within a band around the
notch, having a higher credit rate does not appear to be associated with having
higher contribution levels. Thus, the higher credit rate does not appear to affect the
17Recall from Section 3.4, that savings are calculated based on Saver’s Credit claims. This means that savings
are necessarily bounded by $2000 for both single and head of household filers and $4000 for married couples filing
jointly. Also, due to the credit’s non-refundability, savings are also bounded by tax liability. The latter constraint
is more relevant for the lower half of the income distribution, however, because tax liability is continuous across the
notch, it should not present an issue in estimating the results.
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savings contributions behavior for the marginal saver.
2.7.1 Bounds on the Results
Given that bunching occurs, I can account for the potential bias by bounding the
estimated treatment effect. Lee (2002) shows that when observations are missing
in a non-random way, the data can be trimmed in order to obtain bounds for the
average treatment effect. In the context of this paper, the missing observations can be
interpreted as observations that would have received a low credit rate if income were
completely exogenous, but instead received the high credit rate. Because individuals
to the left of the notch include both those that should have received the credit
and those who bunched to receive the credit, Lee (2002) shows that the average
treatment effect can be interpreted as a weighted average of the two groups. If people
bunch monotonically, then by trimming the observations, the weighted average can
be translated into bounds for the true treatment effect.18
In the absence of bunching the treatment effect of the Saver’s Credit at the notch
is given by
τ = E[Ai|D = 1]− E[Ai|D = 0].
Suppose a fraction, ρ, of those who receive the high credit would have received the
high credit without bunching, while (1− ρ) should have received the low credit but
bunched in order to receive the high credit. Then the treatment effect being measured
is
ρE[Ai|D = 1, B = 1] + (1− ρ)E[Ai|D = 1, B = 0]− E[Ai|D = 0, B = 0],
where B is an indicator that takes on a value of one if someone is a buncher. This
18A similar approach is used in Sallee (2009).
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equation can be rewritten so that
E[Ai|D = 1, B = 0]−E[Ai|D = 0, B = 0]+ρ(E[Ai|D = 1, B = 1]−E[Ai|D = 1, B = 0]),
which includes the true treatment effect and the bias from those who bunch or,
τ |B = 0 + ρ(E[Ai|D = 1, B = 1]− E[Ai|D = 1, B = 0]). (2.5)
The true treatment effect can be bounded if assumptions are made that the bunching
occurs only in one direction. In other words, individuals with either the highest values
of Ai or the lowest values of Ai bunch.
I calculate the proportion of observations to be trimmed by taking the difference
in actual and counterfactual densities for the high credit and dividing by the actual
density for the high credit.19 I calculate the amount of data to be trimmed from the
high credit takers to be 2.9%. Table 2.11 presents the results from trimming the data
for observations within $1,000 of the notch. The lower bound is obtained by trimming
those with the highest values for Ai from the treatment group, which would account
for people who bunch due to high values of savings. The upper bound is obtained
by trimming the lowest values for Ai from the treatment group, where this would
be the absolute highest value for a treatment effect if only those with low values of
savings were induced to bunch. The large range within which the true treatment
effect lies shows again that the policy’s differential impact for those receiving the
higher credit versus the lower credit is weak at best, even with the bunching present.
As a percentage of possible savings eligible for a credit, the increased credit rate
elicits at most an additional 5% in contributions, though this estimate is imprecisely
measured. Thus, in terms of the price effect the credit has on savings, the impact
19For a discussion of calculating the proportion to be trimmed see Lee (2002) and Leibbrandt et al. (2005). The
problem posed in this paper is slightly different because the number of people that selected into the high credit
is unknown. However, I use the counterfactual distribution as a means to determine the number of additional
observations that were treated.
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appears to be neither statistically nor economically significant.
2.7.2 Discussion
Price insensitivity with respect to retirement contributions has been found in past
work looking at retirement contributions behavior.20 Engelhardt and Kumar (2007)
find that savings contributions respond inelastically to 401(k) matches, where a 25%
increase in match is associated with a $365 increase in contributions. Although
this estimate is modest, it is much larger than the one I obtained from this study.
However, my study focuses only on low and middle income households who may be
even less price sensitive due to credit constraints, or other reasons, when it comes to
making retirement contributions.
Related work that focuses specifically on savings behavior of low income house-
holds includes work done on Individual Development Accounts (IDA), which are
accounts that encourage low income individuals to save for a particular purpose such
as buying a house or car. Deposits into IDAs are matched by non-profit organiza-
tions with the goal of aiding assets to build to achieve the set goal. These studies
provide an additional comparison for how matching impacts the savings behavior of
the targeted demographic of the Saver’s Credit. Mills et al. (2006) look at how the
match incentives from IDAs affect behavior and find a large take-up rate by those
offered the program, but that roughly half of those participants withdrew their funds
for non-matchable purposes. Again, the match appears to impact behavior on the
extensive rather than the intensive margin. These findings are in line with a study
by Schreiner et al. (2001) who provide a more comprehensive study on IDAs. Thus,
my finding for a small increase in retirement contributions not statistically different
from zero the notch is consistent with past studies of low income savers.
20Engelhardt and Kumar (2007), Bernheim (2003), Hubbard and Skinner (1996) and Poterba et al. (1996) all
provide summaries of studies on how matching retirement contributions affects retirement savings.
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But this is somewhat surprising in the context of the Saver’s Credit. There is little
response to the price change in retirement contributions even when people select into
receiving the higher credit. Given that those with higher savings have the highest
incentive to bunch, it’s puzzling that when they are included in the sample, the
effect of price on savings is still relatively small and insignificant. These results may
reflect that everyone who saves has the incentive to bunch, and those who do so may
simply have a lower cost to altering their reported income. If this is the case, then
the bunching should not induce bias and the OLS results capture the true effect,
that people appear to be insensitive to the price of retirement contributions.
2.8 Conclusion
The Saver’s Credit, a policy designed to increase retirement savings, also creates
notches, or discontinuities, in a household’s budget constraint. These notches give
households an incentive to misreport income in order to receive a higher credit rate,
thereby creating inefficiencies. In this paper, I show that people respond to incentives
created by the Saver’s Credit by bunching their adjusted gross income (AGI) below
the notch. I add to the literature by repurposing an econometric technique developed
to test an identifying assumption for regression discontinuity, in order to estimate
the behavioral response to a policy. In particular, I use a test developed by McCrary
(2008) to evaluate whether people alter their AGI to get a discontinuous increase in
credit.
The Saver’s Credit presents a large economic incentive to bunch and I find that
individuals indeed respond. The evidence of bunching is strong, with a statistically
significant break in the density of AGI at the notch. This is in contrast to past
studies that show there is no bunching when the incentives are small. However,
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the Saver’s Credit presents large incentives with as much as $600 to be gained with
a $1 change in AGI. As such, these findings contribute to the growing literature
that argues people will bunch, but incentives explored previously are too small to
induce behavioral change. However, relative to the size of the program, the number
of individuals who bunch is small and given that most do not save the maximum
amount, the cost to the government is negligible.
The regression discontinuity estimates I obtain show that the change in credit
rate has a modest, imprecisely measured positive effect on the level of savings con-
tributions for people within $1,000 of the notch. Given that the estimates change
very little when bunchers are accounted for, this finding also suggests that bunchers
make similar retirement contributions to those that do not bunch. This presents
something of a puzzle. Economic theory dictates that people with the largest con-
tributions should also have the most incentive to bunch since they have the most
to gain from the increased credit rate. In addition the higher credit rate lowers the
effective price of making contributions, which should also raise contribution levels.
However, this behavior fails to materialize in the data. It may be the case that in-
dividuals do not factor in the credit rate when making contributions, and thus their
behavior is unaltered by differing rates on savings. This suggests that people are not
forward looking with respect to receiving the credit, and bunching may occur after
the savings decision in order to minimize one’s tax liability. Another possibility is
that people are credit constrained. For example, if an individual has a very high dis-
count rate due to credit constraints, increasing the return on contributions will have
little to no effect. Future work should take a deeper look at the puzzle left in terms
of the lack of response to the Saver’s Credit with respect to savings contributions.
This paper finds strong evidence that some households respond to incentives by
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bunching their incomes so as to receive the high credit rate but they represent a
relatively small fraction of all credits claimed. This paper also finds that households
receiving a higher credit rate do not alter their savings behavior significantly relative
to those that receive a lower credit rate. The implication of these findings is that
the Saver’s Credit induces a behavioral response but not the intended one. People
who take the credit appear to understand the incentive to bunch and the incentive is
large enough to do so, yet they are insensitive to changes in the price of retirement
contributions.
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2.9 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Terms of Saver’s Credit: Credit Rates by Filing Status and Adjusted Gross Income
Household’s Adjusted Gross Income ($)
Credit (%) 50 20 10
Single 0-15,000 15,001- 16,250 16,251- 25,000
Head of Household 0-22,500 22,501- 24,375 24,376- 37,500
Married filing Jointly 0-30,000 30,001- 32,500 32,501- 50,000
Individual Max Credit 1000 400 200
Effective Match (%) 100 25 11
Notes.– Effective match rate is calculated by s
1−s , where s is the credit rate. Between 2002 and 2006 these income
thresholds were not indexed for inflation, though this changed in 2007 after the passing of the Pension Protection
Act of 2006. The individual maximum credit is earned per person and thus married couples filing jointly can earn
twice the maximum listed.
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Figure 2.1: Impact of the Saver’s Credit on After-Tax Income for a Given Amount of Savings,
























Impact of Saver's Credit on Household Budget Constraint
Married Filing Jointly
Original Budget Constraint
Budget Constraint with Saver's Credit


















Note: Not drawn to scale
Notes.– Amount of credit has been exaggerated to illustrate notches in budget set.
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Table 2.2: Aggregate Statistics on the Saver’s Credit, 2002-2006
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Percent of Total Credits Filed, by AGI
No AGI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Between $1 and $5,000 0.0 . . 0.0 0.0
Between $5,001 and $10,000 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8
Between $10,001 and $15,000 4.9 4.9 4.6 5.6 5.0
Between $15,001 and $20,000 13.1 12.6 11.0 12.1 11.7
Between $20,001 and $25,000 20.2 20.1 20.7 20.9 22.8
Between $25,001 and $30,000 12.2 12.7 13.3 13.0 12.2
Between $30,001 and $40,000 23.9 24.2 25.0 24.6 25.0
$40,000 under $50,000 24.9 24.4 24.4 23.5 22.5
Percent Returns with AGI < $50,000 71.2 70.6 69.1 67.9 66.7
Take up rate of returns with AGI < $50,000 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.6
Average credit amount 199 195 191 178 172
Notes.– Source: IRS, Statistics of Income, Table 3.3: Individual Income Tax, All Returns: Tax Liability, Tax Credits,
and Tax Payments, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income. Calculation for take up rate comes from taking the total
number of Saver’s Credits filed and dividing by the total number of returns with AGI below $50,000. This number
is a very rough estimate for the actual take up rate given that I cannot account for tax liability, savings or filing
status.
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Table 2.3: Aggregate Statistics on Taxpayers with IRAs
2000 2001 2002 2004
AGI between $1 and $50,000
Fraction of total pension participation 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.42
Fraction of Eligible that contribute to an IRA 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.23
Fraction of all IRA contributions 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.38
Average IRA contribution ($) 1677 1685 2023 2203
AGI between $1 and $25,000
Fraction of total pension participation 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16
Fraction of Eligible that contribute to an IRA 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.17
Fraction of all IRA contributions 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17
Average IRA contribution ($) 1519 1523 1808 1811
Notes.– Source: IRS, Statistics of Income, Table 2.–Taxpayers with Individual Retirement Arrangement (IRA) Plans,
by Size of Adjusted Gross.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics on Saver’s Credit Filers, 2002-2004
All Savers All Eligible Diff
Credit Non-Credit in
Filers Filers Means
Proportion with Profit or Loss from Business (Sched. C) 0.19 0.11 0.08
(0.000)
Proportion with Capital Gains and Losses (Sched. D) 0.12 0.10 0.02
(0.000)
Proportion with Supplemental Income or Loss (Sched. E) 0.10 0.07 0.03
(0.000)
Proportion with Self-Employed Income 0.13 0.08 0.05
(0.000)
Proportion of Itemizers 0.25 0.14 0.11
(0.000)
Proportion of Tax Liability Withheld 3.68 3.73 -0.05
(0.937)
Mean amount of Saver’s Credit ($) 196
Mean amount of savings ($) 1,198
Mean AGI ($) 30,296 21,636 8,661
(0.000)
Mean Taxes Owed ($) 1,643 1,073 570
(0.000)
Filed Electronically 0.65 0.49 0.16
(0.000)
Used a Paid Preparer 0.67 0.57 0.11
(0.000)
Unweighted Number of Observations 7,718 51,849
Notes.– P Value of difference in parentheses.
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Received 50% Credit -0.016**
(0.004)
Single/Married Filing Separately -0.012**
(0.004)
Head of Household 0.020**
(0.004
Possible Credit Amount (thousands) 0.016**
(0.003)












Number of Observations 58,797
Pseudo-R2 0.14
Notes.– Eligibility is based on falling below the threshold income level and having positive tax liability, it does not
account for whether a person contributed to a retirement plan. Standard errors in parentheses, ** Significant at a
95% level.
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Notes.– Silverman’s Plug-In Bandwidth of 3800 is used for kernel density along with Epanechenikov kernel weights.
Binsize on histogram is 1100.
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Figure 2.4: Carefully Defined Histogram


















Figure 2.5: Smooth Histogram with Local Linear Regression
















Figure 2.6: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income, 2002-2004















Test for Bunching, All years





Number of Observations 7701
Notes.– (Figure) Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
(Table) Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 95% level.
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Table 2.7: Test for Break in the Estimated Density of AGI using Alternative Bandwidths,
2002-2004
θ̂ -0.468* -0.191* -0.164* -0.066
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Bin Size 196.89 196.89 196.89 196.89
Bandwidth 3500 10,000 12,000 20,000
Number of Observations 7701 7701 7701 7701
Notes.– Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 95% level.
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Figure 2.7: Test for Break at $40,000









−5 Bunching at $40,000





Figure 2.8: Test for Break at $25,000
















Notes.– Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
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Figure 2.9: Schedule C Filers















Test for Bunching, Individuals with Schedule C Income
Figure 2.10: Non-Schedule C Filers















Test for Bunching, Individuals with No Schedule C Income
Notes.– Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
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Figure 2.11: Wage-Only Filers















Test For Bunching, Wages and Salary Only
Figure 2.12: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income, 2002
















Test for Bunching, 2002
 
 
Notes.– Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
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Figure 2.13: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income, 2003















Test for Bunching, 2003
Figure 2.14: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income, 2004
















Test for Bunching, 2004
Notes.– Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
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Table 2.8: Test for Break in the Estimated Density of AGI, by year
All 2002 2003 2004
θ̂ -0.267* -0.212 -0.386* -0.090
(0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
Bandwidth 6,523 8,027 7,432 11,121
Joint test for equality (P value) 0.06
Different from 2002 (P value) . 0.16 0.00
Different from 2003 (P value) . . 0.05
Number of Observations 7,701 2,559 2,563 2,579
Notes.– Standard errors in parentheses, * Significant at the 95% level. Results from Wald tests for equality of all
years together and then for each pair of years are included, with the p-values reported in the table.
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Figure 2.15: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income Excluding EITC Filers, 2002

















Test for Bunching, Non−EITC filers 2002
Figure 2.16: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income Excluding EITC Filers, 2003
















Test for Bunching, Non−EITC filers 2003
Notes.– Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
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Figure 2.17: Estimated Density of Adjusted Gross Income Excluding EITC Filers, 2004
















Normalized Adjusted Gross Income
Table 2.9: Test for Break in the Estimated Density of AGI, excluding EITC Filers
All 2002 2003 2004
All Taxpayers θ̂ -0.267* -0.212 -0.386* -0.090
(0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10)
Non-EITC θ̂ -0.322* -0.123 -0.349* -0.353*
(0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19)
Bandwidth 6,697 9,009 9,013 6,208
Number of Observations 6,225 2,065 2,092 2,068
Notes.– (Figure) Dashed line represents 95% confidence bands. Circles represent undersmoothed histogram of data.
(Table) Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at the 95% level.
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Figure 2.18: Percentage of Bunchers Compared to a Counterfactual Distribution






















Figure 2.19: Average Retirement Contributions around Notch
























Average Savings Contribution Among Saver’s Credit Filers, 2002−2004
Table 2.10: Effect of a Change in Credit Rate on the Level of Retirement Contributions Close to
the Notch
Notch Notch Notch Notch Notch
± $1,000 ± $2,000 ± $3,000 ± $4,000 ± $5,000
Avg contribution below the notch (αleft) 1,173.96 1,089.08 1,016.04 1,017.39 979.66
(83) (62) (52) (45) (40)
Avg contribution above the notch (αright) 1,077.21 1,028.30 1,011.33 1,045.90 1,048.40
(114) (77) (61) (52) (46)
Average Treatment Effect 96.75 60.78 4.71 -28.51 -68.74
(αleft − αright) (140) (99) (80) (69) (61)
N Left 322 586 819 338 406
N Right 270 575 316 419 524
Notes.– (Figure) Circles represent average level of retirement contributions that earned a Saver’s Credit within bins
of $200. (Table) Standard errors in parentheses. None of the estimates are significant with 95% confidence.
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Table 2.11: Trimmed Estimates ± $1000 Around the Notch





Average Treat Effect 102.55 -2.19
(αleft − αright) (141) (135)
N Left 313 313
Obs Trimmed 9 9
N Right 270 270
Notes.– Standard errors in parentheses. None of the estimates are significant with 95% confidence.
CHAPTER III
Measuring the Change in Pre-Tax Wage Rates with Respect
to Changes in the Personal Income Tax
3.1 Introduction
Do changes made to the personal income tax have explanatory power for pre-tax
wage changes? Past empirical studies often assume the answer is no. For instance,
studies that use changes in the marginal tax rate as exogenous variation in the net-
of-tax wage often assume pre-tax wage rates are unaffected by the policy change.
This exogenous variation is then used to measure behavioral parameters such as
the labor supply elasticity.1 If pre-tax wage rates indeed change when tax rates are
altered, then the estimates obtained for these behavioral parameters would be biased.
Despite the widespread use of the assumption that pre-tax wage rates are constant
during a tax policy change, few empirical studies test whether this assumption holds
true in the data. This paper aims to address this gap by empirically testing the
nature of the relationship between pre-tax wage rates and the marginal tax rate on
income.
A better understanding of the relationship between pre-tax wage rates and the
marginal tax rate can also provide valuable insight into the incidence of the personal
income tax. Assuming pre-tax wage rates are invariant to a tax change is akin to
1See Eissa (1995), Blundell et al. (1998),Eissa and Liebman (1996). Bosworth and Burtless (1992) offer a survey
on studies estimating the various behavioral impacts of tax reforms.
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assuming the entire burden of the income tax falls on the worker. This would happen,
for example, in a general equilibrium framework if laborers were perfect substitutes
for one another, which is shown more formally below. Studies that measure the
progressivity of the overall tax system must assume the incidence of each tax (e.g.
corporate tax, income tax, etc...) that make up the overall tax system in order to
simulate the tax burden among different income classes.2 Thus, knowing how pre-tax
wage rates react to changes in the income tax has important implications for studies
measuring the progressivity of the overall tax system.
This paper is the first study to use panel data to measure the effect of changes in
marginal tax rates on pre-tax wage rates in the US. Past literature has used panel
data to study a similar effect using policy changes in Scandanavian countries (Bingley
and Lanot (2002) and Blomquist and Selin (2009)). Literature pertaining to the US
is more sparse; a recent study analyzes the median worker in an occupation before
and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Kubik (2004)). We use panel data from
the Survey of Income and Program Participations’s (SIPP) 1986 panel, where we
can observe one-year changes before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Unlike
previous studies, this paper provides separate estimates for continuing workers whose
employment remains constant during the tax changes and for individuals who change
jobs or occupations.3 This distinction is important as it separates individuals whose
wage rates are impacted by general equilibrium changes from those whose wage rates
are driving the general equilibrium changes. Finally, this study uses a counterfactual
tax rate to instrument for the actual tax rate to provide estimates that isolate the
impact of the policy change on pre-tax wage rates. As such, this paper generates
2For example, Pechman and Okner (1974), Browning and Johnson (1979), Davies et al. (1984), and Pechman
(1985) all estimate the overall progressivity of the US tax code by making the underlying assumption that labor
taxes are borne solely by labor.
3Individuals who move in and out of non-employment are also excluded when excluding job and occupation
changers as non-employment is coded as an occupation.
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more complete and accurate estimates of the impact of tax rates on pre-tax wages
for US workers than any previous study we are aware of.
One of the difficulties in estimating a relationship between pre-tax wage rates and
the marginal tax rate on income is that an individual’s tax rate is based in large part
on wage earnings. When a person’s wage rate increases, holding hours constant, her
marginal tax rate could increase if she is bumped into a higher tax bracket. If such
a relationship exists, this could mechanically bias our results. We deal with this
issue by instrumenting for the change in the marginal tax rate using the change in a
calculated counterfactual tax rate. Following Auten and Carroll (1999), we calculate
a counterfactual tax rate by applying the new tax rules from the policy change to the
pre-policy income. This method effectively allows us to rescale the change in marginal
tax rate to reflect only the impact of the policy change. Thus, we are able to isolate
the effect of the new tax rules on wage rates. In addition, we exclude individuals
who changed jobs or occupations during the reform that potentially experienced a
wage change for reasons unrelated to the tax change. By focusing on individuals
that were more stable in their employment status, we obtain an estimate that is less
likely to be biased by a potential mechanical relationship between changes in wage
rates and changes in tax rates.
Following previous literature, we estimate the impact of the net-of-tax rate (1-τ)
on pre-tax wage rates. We find that a 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate, where the
tax rate is defined as the sum of both the federal and state marginal tax rates, is
significantly associated with a 0.26% decrease in real wage for individuals remaining
at the same job before and after the tax change. In other words, individuals moving
from the highest bracket of 50% to a new bracket of 38.5%, would have faced a 6.0%
decrease in their real wage. These results indicate that pre-tax wage rates are in fact
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affected by changes made to tax policy, contrary to the commonly used assumption.
When only considering the change in federal tax rate, a 1% increase in the net-of-tax
rate, is associated with a 0.31% decrease in real wage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background
on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and a brief overview of the literature on this topic;
Section 3.3 outlines a theoretical framework; Section 3.4 describes the data; Section
3.5 presents our empirical estimation and results; Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
The 1980’s marked a decade long era of tax reform in the United States. While
there were numerous acts passed throughout the period, none were more drastic
than the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) com-
pletely restructured the US tax code by, among other changes, flattening the sched-
ule of marginal tax rates on personal income.4 Figure 3.1 illustrates the schedule
of marginal tax rates before and after the reform. Marginal tax rates were simul-
taneously increased for the lowest income levels and lowered for the highest income
levels. To counter the higher marginal rates for low incomes, the personal exemption
and standard deduction amounts increased and the Earned Income Tax Credit was
expanded. Overall, the changes made in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were designed
to be revenue neutral.
Since its inception, a large number of studies have used variation in tax rates
generated by TRA86 to study behavioral responses to tax changes. While many
studies have looked at the hours and the taxable income responses to tax changes,
there are few studies that look at the change in pre-tax wage rates with respect to the
4For background on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 see Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) and Hausman and Poterba
(1987).
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tax rate.5 The goal of this paper is to provide an empirical investigation into whether
individuals facing changes in their marginal tax rate experienced subsequent changes
in their pre-tax wage rates. Although there have been a number of changes made to
the personal income tax since TRA86, TRA86 still provides the largest variation in
rates for the broadest group of individuals. As such, we focus on changes to marginal
tax rates made by TRA86 to study the relationship between pre-tax wage rates and
taxes.
Hausman and Poterba (1987) simulate the overall impact of the 1986 reform
on household behavior. They show, by extrapolating the 1983 tax returns using
TAXSIM to determine the change in tax between 1988 and 1983, that only 13.3%
of individuals faced the same marginal tax rate before and after the reform. Mean-
while, 47.7% of individuals faced a decline of 0-10 percentage points. Thus for most
individuals, the marginal tax rate on personal income indeed changed, with the most
drastic changes concentrated in the highest income brackets. Given that changes in
marginal tax rate were faced by a majority of the population, a change in pre-tax
wage rates may have also resulted from the policy change.
A small but growing body of literature focuses on measuring the impact that
changes in marginal tax rates have on pre-tax wage rates (Moffitt and Wilhelm
(2002), Bingley and Lanot (2002), Kubik (2004), Blomquist and Selin (2009)). Kubik
(2004) looks at changes in the US wage structure that occurred in response to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and is most closely related to the analysis conducted in this
paper. In Kubik’s study, there are two types of labor: skilled and unskilled. Kubik
argues that when changes are made to the tax system that alter the relative supply
of skilled and unskilled labor, then the pre-tax wage rate should increase for the
5See Eissa (1995) and Eissa and Liebman (1996), for example. Saez et al. (2009) provide a survey on this literature.
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type of labor that becomes relatively scarce. For instance, if a labor tax on skilled
workers decreases, which in turn, increases the supply of skilled workers relative to
unskilled workers, then the pre-tax wage of skilled workers should fall.6 This change
in the relative supply between skilled and unskilled workers hinges on the fact that
the change in marginal tax rate affects an individual’s labor supply decision. Kubik
offers two mechanisms through which labor supply can adjust: through changes in
participation and hours decisions and switching occupations. Kubik focuses on the
latter of the two mechanisms and controls for the former by restricting his sample to
include only men as men are generally regarded as unresponsive in hours decisions
with respect to a wage change. If an individual were to switch occupations in response
to a tax change, then this would result in a change in the relative supply of workers
within an occupation. The shift in relative supply among occupations would in
turn result in changes to pre-tax wage rates. To test this hypothesis, Kubik uses
repeated cross-section data from the CPS, which he collapses from the individual to
the occupational level, to relate changes in the median wage within an occupation
to changes in the median tax rate before and after the reform. He finds that, when
the sample is restricted to include only men aged 25 to 55, occupations facing a 10
percentage point decline in median tax rate also faced a 2.5% decrease in median
wage.
This paper extends the analysis in Kubik (2004) and similarly focuses on changes
in wage rates and marginal tax rates before and after TRA86. There are a number
of concerns stemming from the Kubik analysis that we aim to address by using
panel data rather than repeated cross-section data. Kubik notes that if the tax
change caused an increase of workers within a high income occupation, the median
6These results are derived making standard assumptions regarding the production function.
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wage could be driven down by inexperience rather than decreases in the wage rates
of existing workers. Kubik’s solution is to restrict the sample to men, as women,
and in particular married women, have been shown to respond to decreases in the
marginal tax rate on income with increased labor force participation (Eissa (1995)).
By focusing on the subset of individuals who remained at the same job before and
after the tax change, we avoid the issue that an influx of inexperienced workers would
bottom weight the distribution and thus change the median wage. In doing so, we
also use information from the full distribution of wage rate and tax rate changes
rather than focusing on one point in the distribution as in Kubik (2004).
Blomquist and Selin (2009) and Bingley and Lanot (2002) both provide estimates
relating changes in pre-tax wage rates to changes in marginal tax rates on income.
Blomquist and Selin (2009) use panel data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey
to derive an elasticity of pre-tax hourly wage with respect to changes in the net-of-
tax rate. With data on the same individuals in 1981 and in 1991, they use a first
difference approach to obtain wage elasticities with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
Their estimated elasticities lie between 0.14 and 0.16 for married men and between
0.41 and 0.57 for married women, which are large in light of the assumption that
the elasticity is zero. These elasticities are all precisely estimated but, notably, they
are of the opposite sign the results in Kubik (2004) and in contrast to a standard
model. In particular Blomquist and Selin find that if the tax rate increases, making
the net-of-tax rate decrease, then gross wage rates will actually decrease. However,
this finding is in line with their argument that a decrease in the tax rate could have
an impact on an individual’s behavior including a movement towards more difficult
and better compensated tasks, increased effort in wage bargaining, increased work
intensity on the job, and changes in forms of compensation. Thus, a tax rate decrease
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could in fact drive an increase in the wage rate.
Bingley and Lanot (2002) use a Danish matched establishment-worker panel of
individual workers spanning 1980 to 1991 to study the impact of tax changes on
gross wage rates. Their data allow for tracking the same individuals at the same
establishment over time. Because the data is collected at the firm level, if a person
changes jobs, she is eliminated from their sample. The authors use a difference-
in-difference approach which utilizes within-establishment variation in wage rates.
They use local tax rates to instrument for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates and
estimate an elasticity of gross wage rates with respect to the marginal rate of income
tax of 0.44. Similar to Kubik (2004), Bingley and Lanot find that increasing the tax
rate on income leads to an increase in gross wage rates.
In summary, the past literature that estimates a relationship between pre-tax
wage changes and marginal tax rates shows mixed results. Whereas Kubik (2004)
and Bingley and Lanot (2002) estimate a positive relationship, Blomquist and Selin
(2009) instead estimate a negative relationship. However, Blomquist and Selin argue
this reverse finding is not surprising and provide a story for why a tax decrease could
lead to an increase in wage rate. Both Bingley and Lanot (2002) and Blomquist and
Selin (2009) conduct their analysis with panel data in countries with tax systems
drastically different to that found in the US. Also, both countries contain a stronger
union presence than in the US, which makes generalizing their results to the US
more difficult. Kubik (2004), on the other hand, analyzes pre-tax wage changes in
the US. However, he focuses only on one point in the distribution of wage rates by
occupation to determine how the median wage rate within an occupation changes
with respect to changes to the median tax rate.
Our analysis contributes to this small literature by offering an additional estimate
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for changes in wage rates with respect to marginal tax rates on income in the US.
We make use of the full distribution of changes in wage rates to measure the effect
of changes in the tax rates for continuing workers. By focusing on people who are
relatively stable in their employment, we avoid the concern raised in Kubik (2004)
that identifying the impact of tax rates off of the median wage within an occupation
may also include the impact of changes in the distribution of experience within an
occupation. Our study complements Kubik (2004) in that we find similar results
even after excluding individuals who could be experiencing changes in wage rates for
reasons other than the policy change.
3.3 Theory
As seen in Figure 3.1, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had a differential impact on
individuals in the higher income brackets compared to those in the lower brackets.
This variation in tax changes allows for identifying the impact of taxes on wage
rates. However, a typical simplification that workers are identical no longer holds
as we observe many wage rates and many tax changes. To motivate the empirical
section, we consider a one sector model with the simplifying assumption that there
are two types of labor to analyze the effects of a type-specific labor tax.7 The model
we present is a static model that we use to analyze short-run responses of wage rates
to tax changes. We show that the effect of a tax change on wage rates for one type
of worker will largely depend on the firm’s elasticity of substitution over the different
types of labor as well as each labor type’s preferences for working.
7We use a framework and notation similar to that of Fullerton and Metcalf (2002). The model presented in this
paper has one sector with two types of labor and ignores the role of capital, whereas Fullerton and Metcalf present
both a one-sector and a two-sector model each with capital and one type of labor. Kubik (2004) includes a model
with two types of labor; however, one type of labor is supplied inelastically.
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3.3.1 Firm’s Problem
Suppose there are two types of labor, L1 and L2, used as inputs into a production
function, F (L1, L2), that produces output, X. The production function is assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale and the price of X is normalized to one. We
assume that the labor market is perfectly competitive and workers are paid their
marginal product, so that
F1(L1, L2) = w1
and
F2(L1, L2) = w2.
With constant returns to scale technology, profits must be zero, giving us the follow-
ing condition:
X = w1L1 + w2L2.
Letting Ẑ denote the percent deviation from equilibrium (dZ/Z) and taking the


















, we can rewrite this equation as
X̂ = θ1L̂1 + θ2L̂2.
From the constant returns condition we also have that
X̂ = θ1(ŵ1 + L̂1) + θ2(ŵ2 + L̂2).
After substituting for X̂ from the production function, we can derive an equation






The definition for the elasticity of substitution, σx between L1 and L2 is given by,
σx(ŵ1 − ŵ2) = L̂2 − L̂1.
Finally, substituting for ŵ1 and using θ1 + θ2 = 1, gives an equation for the relative
demand for L̂2 and L̂1
− σx
θ1
ŵ2 = L̂2 − L̂1. (3.1)
3.3.2 Workers’ Problem
For the worker’s problem, we assume each type of worker is endowed with one
unit of time. The worker’s time is allocated between market work, L, which is an
input into the production of X, and leisure, l, so that
Li + li = 1,
where i ∈ 1, 2. Workers derive utility from consumption of output, X, and leisure l,
(1 − L). Both types of workers are assumed to have the same CES utility with the
following functional form:














where γi represents the type-specific elasticity of substitution between X and l. Each
worker’s objective is to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
Xi = wiLi(1− τi) +G,
where G is a lump sum transfer from the government and τi is a tax on wage income
for type i.
After solving for type i’s respective maximization problem and taking log deriva-
tives we obtain:8
X̂i − l̂i = γi(ŵi − τ̂i).
8The economy is assumed to have no initial taxes.
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From the worker’s budget constraint, we also know that
X̂i = θi(L̂i + ŵi − τ̂i).











and substituting for X̂i,
γi(ŵi − τ̂i)− φiL̂i = θi(L̂i + ŵi − τ̂i),







Finally we can derive an expression for the change in relative labor supply between
type 1 and type 2 workers as a function of the model’s parameters, wage changes,
and tax changes,



























is the income effect. Substituting
in for ŵ1, we can derive an expression in terms of changes in only ŵ2,















Assuming that the government returns tax revenue to the households as a lump sum
payment, the income effect is ignored and instead we are left with the compensated












9TRA86 was designed to be revenue neutral, which lessens the potential impact of income effects.
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3.3.3 Equilibrium
Now, substituting Equation (3.2) into Equation (3.1) to equate labor supply and





− ηc2 − ηc1 θ2θ1
. (3.3)
Thus, we are left with an expression that relates the change in w2 to changes in the
labor tax on both type 1 and type 2 workers. Once we know how w2 changes, we
can also derive the change in w1 using the relationship ŵ1 = − θ2θ1 ŵ2
To gain intuition, we can posit the special cases in production of perfect substi-
tutes, perfect complements, and Cobb-Douglas and determine how wage rates will
change for a given value of σ. For simplicity, suppose the change in τ1 is zero. For a













This shows that ŵ2 will depend on the compensated elasticities of supply for both
types of workers, the elasticity of substitution of the two types of workers in produc-
tion, and their relative value shares in the output market. If L1 and L2 are perfect
substitutes, that is σ = ∞, then the change in w2 with respect to a change in τ2 is
zero. This also means the change in wage of type 1 workers is zero. Thus, type 2
workers bear the full burden of the tax with a take home wage of w2(1 − τ2). This
makes intuitive sense in that if a tax is imposed on type 2 workers, then the firm
will respond by substituting to type 1 workers. Thus, the pre-tax wage change will
be zero since the firm is only willing to pay one wage.













The change in w2 will depend on the relative compensated labor supply elasticities
of type 1 and type 2 workers and the relative value shares that each type has in the
output market. If ηc1 > η
c
2, then the change in w2 with respect to τ̂2 will be less than




2, then the change in w2 with respect to τ̂2 will be










= −θ2. Overall, the change
in the wage of type 2 workers resulting from a tax on type 2 workers will be bounded
between 0 and 1 and will depend on the compensated elasticity of supply between
type 1 and type 2 workers if they are perfect complements in production.
An intermediate case between perfect complements and perfect substitutes is that
of Cobb-Douglas production. When a Cobb-Douglas production function is used,












If ηc1 > η
c




other hand, if ηc1 < η
c
2, then the change in w2 with respect to τ̂2 will be greater than
θ1
2












The theory presented here shows that pre-tax wage rates need not remain constant
when a tax is imposed on labor. One exception includes the case when different types
of labor are perfect substitutes for one another in production. However, if this is not
the case, then there will be a resulting change in pre-tax wage rates. In these cases
the model suggests the change in the wage of type i resulting from a tax on only
type i will be bounded between 0 and 1, and the magnitude of the change depends
on the elasticity of substitution between the types of labor, the relative labor supply
elasticities of the workers, and each type’s share of value in output. Thus, a testable
implication of the model is that an individual’s wage rate should have a positive
relationship with their own marginal tax rate (τ), or a negative relationship with
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their net-of-tax rate (1 − τ). To test this implication, we decompose the data into
types defined by income, gender, and marital status. We then focus on the short-run
response of wage rates to changes in the marginal tax rate on income.
There are a number of ways in which the data can be parsed in order to test
the model’s implications. In the model, labor types are distinguished by differing
marginal productivities, which, in turn, determine wage rates and tax rates. In
the data, a worker’s true marginal productivity is unobserved. If an individual is
actually paid her marginal product, as would be the case in a perfectly competitive
market, then income can serve as a proxy for productivity. Thus, a natural empirical
counterpart for labor types that vary in productivity is to separate the data by
income.
The model also allows for differences in labor supply elasticity among labor types.
Women in this era were generally believed to have a higher labor supply elasticity
than men.10 Thus, differences in labor supply elasticities between types can be
examined by analyzing men and women separately. But grouping the data by sex
highlights a simplification of the model, which is that in the model households are
comprised of one individual whose tax rate is derived based on his or her type.
However, in the US, married households are taxed based on their joint income, which
may be earned by two individuals of differing types. For example, if one household
member has a high wage rate, while the other has a low wage rate, then the low wage
individual’s marginal tax rate will not correspond to that member’s productivity. As
such, the model may be better suited to predict the behavior of single tax filers.
10See Pencavel (1986) and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) for surveys of the literature on labor supply elastic-
ities for men and women, respectively.
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3.4 Data
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), conducted by the U.S.
Census Bureau, is a panel survey of households about income sources, labor supply,
welfare participation, and other economic and family outcomes. Each individual in
the household is surveyed every four months regarding each intervening month. We
focus entirely on the 1986 SIPP panel, which covers the period between October
1985 and March 1988, as this panel includes monthly data for the full calendar years
1986 and 1987, the year before TRA86 and the year of its implementation.11
The SIPP collects information on each employed individual’s jobs (up to two per
person per interview wave), including hours worked, wage and/or salary, occupation,
industry, and tenure in the job. About 59 percent of employees report only their
monthly earnings in the job, and not the hourly wage; for these individuals, we divide
monthly earnings by the product of weeks worked that month and the usual weekly
hours worked in the four-month interview wave to get an imputed hourly wage. To
get an annual wage figure, our outcome variable in most of our analysis, we take the
mean over each monthly wage (reported where available, but often only the imputed
wage) for that month’s primary job, defined as the job with the highest hourly wage.
Because this imputation process could result in some hourly wage figures that are
unrealistically high (if, for example, few hours are reported, or if labor and non-labor
income are confused), we winsorize wage rates at the 95th percentile, capping the
1986 hourly wage at $17 per hour and the 1987 wage at $18/hr.12
11Other SIPP panels also cover this period, but survey households for only part of these two key years. It may
be useful to observe households during the full calendar year 1988 as well, in case the full effect of TRA86 is not
felt until after taxpayers have adjusted to the new regime, but only the 1987 SIPP Panel covers this full year, and
it lacks monthly data for most of the pre-period.
12The accuracy of the hourly wage measures in the SIPP data becomes an important question, as our results rest
on using self-reported data that may be rife with measurement error. Stinson (2002) estimates the measurement
error in SIPP data using administrative earnings data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and finds that
18 percent of the variation in SIPP annual job earnings can be attributed to measurement error, comparable to the
21 percent measurement error found in the Detailed Earnings Records from the SSA. That the measurement error in
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Given the large number of calculated observations, we may be worried this might
impact the results. In particular, Borjas (1980) discusses the spurious negative re-
lationship that can occur when calculating the wage by dividing earnings by hours
worked, and then estimating using hours as the dependent variable. This division
bias poses less of a concern in the context of this paper as wage is used as the
dependent variable. However, the measurement error may be larger for calculated
observations. Although we are able to distinguish true reported hourly wage rates
from imputed wage rates, the imputations are predominately made for individuals
with higher incomes. This means, estimating the results for only the reported sam-
ple would eliminate much of the variation in tax rates that was concentrated in the
higher income brackets. Thus, we are reluctant to exclude imputed observations,
and instead we proceed with the caveat that a large portion of our observations are
calculated using labor income and hours.
We use the NBER TAXSIM database to calculate marginal federal and state tax
rates.13 We group individuals within a family into tax filing units, consisting of the
respondent, his or her spouse, and their dependents. Because the 1986 SIPP panel
includes most of the information needed to calculate the tax filing unit’s itemized
deductions, except for short- and long-term capital gains, we do not assume that tax
filing units take the standard deduction.14
In some specifications, we exclude workers who change occupations and/or jobs
the SIPP earnings data is smaller than that from the SSA is promising. Both types of data are found to have serial
correlation in their measurement error, and specifically for the SIPP data the correlation worsens the attenuation
bias resulting from measurement error. We take first-differences of the data, which helps to alleviate some concern
raised by the serial correlation. Also, given that we expect a negative coefficient, the attenuation bias is against
finding a result.
13Because we are interested in both federal and state marginal rates, our sample excludes individuals with missing
information about their state of residence and those living in the unidentifiable states in the 1986 SIPP: Alaska,
Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
14The TAXSIM procedure assumes that the taxpayers opt for the standard deduction only when itemized deduc-
tions are not worthwhile. The 1986 SIPP panel collected information on tax filing in a topical module near the April
15 filing deadline in each year, but this data is no longer publicly available, so we cannot be certain that taxpayers
are paying their minimum possible tax, nor do we know their actual filing status (e.g., whether married individuals
filed one joint return or separate individual returns).
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sometime during 1987. We define “occupation” as the type of job an individual holds
and “job” as the given position an individual holds for a particular employer. SIPP
asks respondents for their occupation at each interview, and attempts to identify
one’s employer across waves. It is possible that the same occupation or employer
could be coded differently across waves, inducing false transitions and eliminating
valid observations from our sample.15
3.4.1 Impact of TRA86
The individual changes between 1986 and 1987 in the marginal tax rate on per-
sonal income are summarized in Figure 3.2. Roughly 29.3% of the population expe-
rienced an increase in combined federal and state tax rate while 55.9% experienced a
decrease, and the remaining 14.8% experienced no change. The 1987 income, which
is used to calculate the 1987 tax rate, includes changes made to wage rates that
might have occurred for reasons other than the tax change. Thus, we also compare
a counterfactual tax rate, derived using 1986 income with the 1987 rules, to the
actual 1986 rate. Figure 3.3 shows that roughly 14.9% had an increase, 59.9% had
a decrease, and 25.2% had no change. The counterfactual comparison is relatively
close to the actual change in terms of whether the change is positive, negative, or
zero; however, the counterfactual changes are more concentrated between a decrease
in tax rate of 0.10 and an increase in tax rate of 0.10.
For those taxpayers whose marginal rate decreased, TRA86 resulted in a substan-
tial reduction in the federal tax burden, more than $1,700 (Table 3.1). The increase
in federal taxes for those whose actual marginal rate increased is due largely to tax-
15Another concern with panel data like the SIPP is seam bias (Czajka (1983), Ham et al. (2009)), where transitions
that occur during non-interview months are reported during the month of interview. Seam bias is more of a concern
in event studies and likely won’t affect our results, but it could affect our sample, if people who report a job or
occupation transition in their first interview in 1987 actually changed jobs during 1986. As with the false transitions
due to coding inconsistencies, this will only make our sample smaller than it should be.
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payers who earned more in 1987 than in 1986, and thus move up one or more tax
brackets; for those whose rate increased, their tax burden would have increased by
an average of only $262 using their 1986 income and the 1987 tax rules.
Table 3.1 also suggests a positive correlation between wage changes and tax rate
changes, which matches the prediction of our theoretical model. Taxpayers whose
marginal rate decreased saw an average 93 cent decrease in their real pre-tax (hourly
or imputed) wage, while wage rates rose by more than a dollar per hour for those
whose rates increased. While this correlation could be driven by the tax rate’s own
dependence on wages, the patterns are similar (though smaller in magnitude) when
looking at the change in marginal tax rate holding income constant at the 1986 level.
Figure 3.4, which plots the change in net-of-tax rate (so the direction of correlation
is reversed) against the change in wage, indicates that this correlation is consistent
throughout the wage distribution.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics on the sample grouped by 1986 tax rates.
As expected, there is substantial variation of demographic characteristics for each
grouping of brackets. For example, the higher brackets include a larger proportion of
college graduates compared to the lower brackets, while women are more likely to fall
into a lower tax bracket. By breaking down the data into subsets of the population,
we can observe how differences in marginal product and in the elasticity of labor
supply could potentially impact changes in wage rates. Income differences are used
to proxy for differences in marginal product, while gender and marital status are used
to proxy for differences in labor supply elasticity. Thus, we focus on three different
ways to partition the data: income, gender, and marital status. By slicing the data
for the regression analysis, we hope to gain a better sense for the source of variation
in the wage response to tax changes.
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3.5 Empirical Model and Results
The model presented in Section 3.3 predicts that each worker type’s wage rate
could be affected when changes are made to a tax on a specific type of labor. We now
measure the extent to which the theory holds true in the data. A challenge arises
when empirically estimating the impact of taxes on wage rates, which is that wage
rates also influence the tax rate that an individual faces. To mitigate this simultaneity
problem, we instrument for the actual tax change using a counterfactual tax rate,
which is constructed by applying the 1987 tax rules to income earned in 1986.
We focus on short-run changes that occur between 1986 and 1987. This time
span may be rather short for general equilibrium effects to fully materialize. Thus,
we expect any effect taxes have on wage rates to be relatively small in magnitude.
However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a highly publicized event that had been
discussed at length before going into effect in 1987. Therefore, the existence of an
effect could be expected, especially in light of the estimates found in Kubik (2004).
3.5.1 Empirical Model
To measure the relationship between wage changes and tax changes, we start with
a model describing the relationship between an individual i’s pre-tax wage and the
net-of-tax rate:
lnwit = αit + β ln(1− τit) + γXi + εit, (3.4)
where wit is the real wage of person i at time t, τit is the marginal tax for person i at
time t, Xi is a set of time-invariant demographic characteristics, and εit is the sum
of an unobservable fixed effect, ηi, and an error term with standard assumptions, µit.
The unobserved fixed effect will likely bias cross-sectional OLS estimates. We can
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eliminate this individual fixed effect by estimating a first-differences model,
∆ lnwi = αi + β∆ ln(1− τi) + ∆εi. (3.5)
Estimating the transformed equation could also lead to biased results due to the
endogeneity of marginal tax changes to wage changes. For instance, if real wage rates
increase for a reason unrelated to taxes, this can push an individual into a higher
bracket. The increase in tax rate would decrease her net-of-tax rate and mechanically
force a negative estimate of β. Given that the theoretical model presented in Section
3.3 predicts β to be negative (or the coefficient on τ to be positive), this would
bias β in the expected direction.16 To minimize the impact of this bias, we use
an instrumental variables approach, where the change in a counterfactual tax rate
serves as an instrument for the change in the actual tax rate. This counterfactual
tax rate is the marginal (federal plus state) rate that a taxpayer faces in 1987 using
that taxpayer’s income from 1986. Following Auten and Carroll (1999), we estimate
the first stage regression:
∆ ln(1− τai ) = ai + γ∆ ln(1− τ
cf
i ) + ξi, (3.6)
where τ cfi corresponds to the counterfactual tax rate and τ
a
i refers to the actual tax
rate for person i. We then use the predicted change in tax rate, ∆ ln(1− τ̃i), as the
independent variable in Equation (3.4). This method, by construction, removes the
change in tax rate that would have occurred due to changes in taxable income in
order to isolate the impact of the change in tax policy.17
16Blomquist and Selin (2009) give reasons why the coefficient on the net-of-tax rate could be positive.
17Using a counterfactual tax rate as an instrument in the context of estimating the elasticity of taxable income
has received some criticism due its potential to violate the exogeneity assumption (Moffitt and Wilhelm (2002) and
Blomquist and Selin (2009)). If the changes in tax rate are monotonic in income (e.g. higher incomes get bigger
tax rate changes), then the exogeneity assumption could be violated (Weber (2010)). In particular, if tax changes
are highest for higher incomes, then, because the base year income is used to predict a counterfactual tax rate, any
shocks to transitory income are larger for higher incomes and therefore correlated with the larger tax rate change.
However, our results focus on labor market earnings, which are likely less subject to transitory shocks (other than
unemployment spells, and we exclude those with more than three months not working), and we use reported hourly
wage rates where available.
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We can now write the percent change in wage as a function of the predicted tax
change,
∆ lnwi = α + β∆ ln(1− τ̃i) + εi. (3.7)
The theoretical model suggests that β should be negative – a decrease in marginal
tax rate, as experienced by more than half of the sample, which is an increase in
the marginal net-of-tax rate, should be associated with a decrease in the real pre-tax
wage.
Because the location on the income distribution is driving the counterfactual tax
rate, we may be concerned that this location may also predict wage changes. This
would result in a coincidental systematic relationship between tax changes and wage
changes, when in truth, the correlation was with income. Figure 3.5 shows the
difference between the counterfactual and actual tax rates by 1986 income.18 This
figure highlights that the tax changes generated by the new tax policy varied across
the income distribution with no discernable pattern based on income. As long as
income in previous years does not share a similar pattern with wage changes, then, it
is unlikely any measured relationship between changes in wage rates and tax changes
would have occurred absent the tax change. Figure 3.6 shows the log wage changes
in the previous year (1985-1986) by 1985 income.19 The figure shows that location on
the income distribution does not appear to predict wage changes in any meaningful
way. Thus, measuring a coincidental impact of tax rates on wage rates is less of a
concern.
18Income is binned in $100 increments and the mean difference in counterfactual and actual tax rate is graphed.
19Income is binned in $100 increments and the mean log wage change is graphed.
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3.5.2 Estimation Results
The IV results from estimating Equation (3.7), where τ is the sum of federal and
state marginal tax rates, are summarized in Table 3.3. Column (1) displays results
using the full sample without controlling for individual or firm characteristics. We
find that a 1% increase in the net-of-tax rate (1 − τ) leads to a 0.51% decrease in
real pre-tax wag rates; that is, a decrease in an individual’s marginal tax rate is
associated with decreases in her real wage, consistent with the theoretical prediction
from Section 3.3. For these results, we report the 95 percent confidence interval
around our point estimate; we can reject the null hypotheses that this coefficient is
equal to zero or to negative one, suggesting that the burden of this tax change is
borne at least in part by both workers and firms.20
Column (2) displays results when individual and firm level controls are included.
The coefficient of interest, that on the change in log net-of-tax rate, decreases slightly
compared to column (1), from 0.51 to 0.43, but zero and negative one remain outside
the 95 percent confidence interval. Controlling for individual characteristics does not
appear to effect our qualitative result.21
We conduct the same analysis for the sample excluding job and occupation chang-
ers in columns (3) and (4). We focus on individuals who stay at the same job and
occupation because this group is least likely to see wage changes other than the gen-
eral equilibrium effect of the tax change, allowing us to potentially avoid attributing
wage changes caused by non-tax factors to taxes (e.g., changes in union coverage
or different benefit/wage tradeoffs at the new job). The estimate of the impact of
taxes on wage rates for this group should be more conservative, as we neglect to
20Table 3.3 also includes the first stage results, where the F-statistic indicates that the weak instrument problem
is not a concern.
21Most of the coefficients on the individual and firm controls are not statistically significant in the second stage,
except marital status and the non-white indicator, which are significant at the 10 percent level. Marital status and
its interaction with gender and age are the only statistically significant variables in the first stage.
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account for taxpayers who switch jobs to take advantage of the new tax regime.
This is confirmed by our results where, after excluding job and occupation changers,
the coefficient on the net-of-tax rate (federal+state) change is, as expected, smaller
in magnitude. However, the coefficient is still negative and statistically significant.
In particular, we find that, after controlling for demographic characteristics and ex-
cluding job and occupation changers, a 1% increase in net-of-tax rate led to a 0.26%
decrease in real wage rates.22 Table 3.4 shows results when the same regressions are
run using only the federal tax rate (instead of federal and state tax). The results are
similar to Table 3.7, but the magnitudes are larger. Table 3.4 shows, after including
demographic controls and excluding job and occupation changers, that a 1% increase
in the net-of-tax rate is associated with a statistically significant 0.31% decrease in
wage.23
To assess the magnitude of these results, suppose an individual (who did not
change jobs between 1986 and 1987) makes $10/hr in 1986 and faces a marginal
federal tax rate of 20 percent, making her net-of-tax rate 0.80. Now, suppose that
her net-of-tax rate increases to 0.90, that is, her net-of-tax rate increases by 12.5%.
The results in column (4) suggest that her 50% (or 10 percentage point) decrease
in federal tax rate will be associated with a 3.875% pre-tax real wage decrease, to
$9.61/hr. While she will keep more of her income post-tax, she will not reap the
full benefit of the tax reduction, as would have been the case if her pre-tax wage
remained the same.
22We also estimated the model for just the sample of job or occupation changers. The point estimates are higher,
approximately -0.8 both with and without controls and for both federal taxes only and federal plus state taxes. The
coefficients are significantly different from zero, but with the smaller sample size and the larger estimated magnitude,
we can no longer reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to negative one.
23The OLS results for Equation 3.5 are not presented in the paper. The OLS results, as expected, overestimate
the impact of the net-of-tax changes on changes in wage rates. The OLS estimate on the net-of-tax change when
considering both the federal and state tax rates is -0.63 while the IV coefficient for the comparable sample is -0.26.
When considering only the change in federal tax rate, the OLS coefficient on the net-of-tax change is -0.71, while
the IV coefficient for the comparable sample is -0.31.
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Table 3.5 shows the results when dividing the sample into those above and below
the median annual income in 1986 ($17,712). The results show that the negative
relationship between the net-of-tax rate and wage changes is concentrated within
the higher income group, particularly when excluding job and occupation changers.
In fact, the point estimate on the net-of-tax rate for low income individuals is posi-
tive, though not significantly different from zero, after excluding job and occupation
changers. This reversal of sign may seem surprising, but is actually consistent with
the predictions of the model presented above. In particular, if income is a proxy for
skill, then we can observe two types of labor: low skill and high skill. The model
expects that the change in wage for high skilled workers has the opposite sign as
the wage changes for the low skilled workers. Given that the tax changes were most
pronounced at the highest income levels, this is akin to a relative tax change for only
the high skilled workers. Thus, according to the model, the decrease in tax rate for
most high income individuals is associated with a wage decrease, but for low income
workers, this would result in a wage increase under reasonable restrictions for the
elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled workers. As such, our results
are in line with the model’s predictions for high income individuals. For low income
individuals, the point estimate on the coefficient is consistent with the theoretical
predictions, but we cannot reject the null of no change in the pre-tax wage rate.
An interesting exercise is to observe how the results vary by gender, given that
women are believed to supply labor more elastically than men. When breaking down
the data by sex (Table 3.6), the coefficient on tax changes is larger in magnitude for
men than women. These results seem surprising given that if women have a larger
elasticity of supply, we might expect that women’s wages should be more responsive
than their male counterparts. Further decomposition of the data by marital sta-
81
tus reveals little difference between single men and married men, with the results
remaining negative and statistically different from zero. However, the differences
among married and single women is stark. Although the coefficient on the net-of-
tax rate for married women remains negative, it is no longer statistically significant.
Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is roughly 10 times smaller for married
women compared to their single counterparts. On the other hand, wage rates for
single women share a similar coefficient on the net-of-tax rate to that of men. That
married women’s wage rates appear to be unaffected by tax rates may stem from
the fact that if a married woman is the secondary earner, then when filing jointly
her marginal tax rate may not necessarily correspond to her wage rate. Thus, the
model’s predictions may be less suited particularly for married women as it fails to
account for a joint system of taxation. An alternative explanation is that the elas-
ticity of demand in production for married women is large, with the limiting case
of perfect substitutes illustrated in Section 3.3. If labor demand for married woman
is relatively more elastic than their compensated labor supply elasticities, then the
estimated coefficient actually should move closer to zero, where zero is the limiting
case when married women are perfect substitutes for one another.
3.6 Summary and Conclusion
Using panel data from the SIPP, this paper looks at whether pre-tax wage rates
were impacted by changes made to the net-of-tax rate before and after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. This paper provides strong evidence that pre-tax wage rates
are in fact altered in response to change in tax policy. We find that a 1% increase in
the net-of-tax rate is associated with a 0.26% decrease in real wage for individuals
who changed neither job nor occupation. This estimate is derived inclusive of the
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state tax rate, avoiding bias from their exclusion as state taxes were also changing
during the reform period. When considering only the federal tax rate change, a 1%
increase in the net-of-tax rate is associated with a 0.31% decrease in real wage.
This is not the first study to attempt to document such a relationship between
pre-tax wage rates and the marginal tax rate. However, this study is the first to
use panel data with a rich set of controls in conjunction with TAXSIM to study
this particular question for the US. As such, our estimates are more conservative
than previous studies as we are able to exclude variation in wage rates that is not
attributable to the tax change. Also, our data allow for a more detailed exploration
of results since we are able to observe individuals and not just points in a changing
distribution.
By further analyzing the data by subgroups, we are able to explore where in the
income and demographic distributions the major wage changes are taking place. In
particular, the negative relationship between changes in wage rates and tax changes
exists in the upper half of the income distribution after excluding job and occupa-
tion changers, while the coefficient on the net-of-tax rate for the lower half of the
income distribution is positive but not significantly different from zero. This result
is consistent with a one-sector model with two types of labor where a tax is levied
on only one type. Breaking the data down by gender and marital status reveals that
married women have the smallest association between wage changes and tax changes
that is not significantly different than zero. Thus pre-tax wage rates for married
women appear invariant to policy changes, consistent with the standard assumption.
That the results do not hold for married women is less surprising given that the
model does not account for a joint system of taxation. Additionally, the lack of
response in married women’s pre-tax wage rates could also result when there exists a
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large elasticity of demand for their labor. However, differentiating between the two
hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper, but raises an interesting question for
future research.
The estimates derived in this paper provide evidence contrary to the commonly
used assumption in previous studies that wage rates do not change when the marginal
tax rate on income changes. Our results suggest that assuming income taxes are fully
borne by labor is not supported by the data, with the possible exception of married
women. In addition, we provide evidence supporting this claim with a more conser-
vative estimate that excludes individuals who changed jobs or occupations during the
tax reform. The results from this paper have implications for past empirical studies
that use changes in tax policy to estimate behavioral parameters. Given that changes
in wage rates work to counter the tax change, past work using variation in marginal
tax rates to obtain estimates of labor supply elasticities may be understated. Also,
past work using variation in marginal tax rates to measure the elasticity of taxable
income could also be understated as general equilibrium changes in wage rates might
dampen the predicted changes in taxable income. Overall, this paper contributes,
with additional evidence, to a growing literature that has shown pre-tax wage rates
are in fact affected by changes in marginal tax rates, and thus highlights that cau-
tion should be used when measuring behavioral parameters through variation from
changes in tax policy.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Tax Reform of 1986: Bracket Changes









































































Actual Change in Marginal Tax Rate between 1987 and 1986
Federal & State Taxes
14.81%
34.18%
Increased by > 10 prctage pts Increased by < 10 prctage pts No Change
Decreased by < 10 prctage pts Decreased by >10 prctage pts
Notes.– Federal and state marginal tax rates are calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM.
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Counterfactual Change in Marginal Tax Rate between 1987 and 1986
Federal & State Taxes
52.33%
Increased by > 10 prctage pts Increased by < 10 prctage pts No Change
Decreased by < 10 prctage pts Decreased by >10 prctage pts
Notes.– Federal and state marginal tax rates are calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM. Counterfactual tax rate is
calculated using 1986 income with 1987 tax rules.
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Table 3.1: Impact of TRA86 on Overall Tax Burden
Change in Actual Marginal Tax Rate, 1987-1986
Lower No Higher
Rate Change Rate
Mean Change in Fed Tax Burden ($) -1721 -10 2042
(3706) (310) (3579)
Mean Change in State Tax Burden ($) -230 10 443
(741) (69) (803)
Mean Change in Wage ($) -0.93 -0.06 1.14
(3.11) (1.58) (2.67)
Mean Percent Change in Wage -5 24 56
(98) (253) (245)
Mean Percent Change in Log Wage -13 3 22
(56) (85) (55)
% of Total 60.1 6.5 33.4
Number of Observations 7656 835 4258
Notes.– All variables other than tax rates come from 1986 SIPP. Federal and state marginal tax rates are calculated
using NBER’s TAXSIM.
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−50 −40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Log Change in Real Wage, 1987−1986
Notes.– Wage data come from 1986 SIPP. Federal and state marginal tax rates are calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM.
Each point represents the mean log change in net-of-tax rate for bins of 1 percentage point for the log change in real
wage.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, by 1986 Federal Tax Bracket
1986 Bracket
0 11-18 22-28 33-38 42-50 All
Mean 1986 Income ($) 3204 11798 21132 36800 61018 14897
(3529) (5949) (10192) (17423) (32240) (14746)
Mean 1986 Fed Tax ($) -47 838 3199 9408 23000 2378
(123) (635) (1687) (3541) (8209) (4166)
Mean 1986 State Tax ($) -14 176 647 1650 2881 430
(93) (240) (650) (1480) (2665) (876)
Mean Real 1986 Wage ($) 1.46 5.41 9.03 12.74 13.94 6.05
(2.04) (3.00) (4.23) (4.88) (5.46) (5.03)
Age 37 37 38 42 46 38
(14) (13) (12) (11) (10) (13)
Married (0/1) 0.54 0.68 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.62
(0.50) (0.46) (0.48) (0.45) (0.43) (0.49)
Female (0/1) 0.68 0.53 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.51
(0.47) (0.50) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50)
Nonwhite (0/1) 0.26 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.20
(0.44) (0.41) (0.34) (0.29) (0.23) (0.40)
Less than HS (0/1) 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.13
(0.40) (0.35) (0.27) (0.19) (0.15) (0.34)
Some College (0/1) 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.23
(0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42)
College (0/1) 0.11 0.14 0.26 0.49 0.59 0.20
(0.31) (0.35) (0.44) (0.50) (0.49) (0.40)
Fed Tax Diff, 1987-1986 ($) 569 588 -552 -3483 -11366 -363
(2034) (2438) (2860) (5693) (10549) (3767)
State Tax Diff, 1987-1986 ($) 130 148 -43 -499 -1068 3
(469) (558) (689) (1250) (2122) (764)
Wage Change, 1987-1986 ($) 0.35 -0.15 -0.42 -0.98 -1.28 -0.19
(2.16) (2.77) (3.19) (3.89) (4.17) (2.94)
Wage Change, 1987-1986 (%) 74 7 3 1 -3 16
(365) (108) (63) (115) (69) (174)
Log Wage Change, 1987-1986 25 -3 -6 -10 -11 0
(93) (57) (46) (46) (47) (60)
Notes.– All variables other than tax rates come from 1986 SIPP. Federal and state marginal tax rates are calculated
using NBER’s TAXSIM.
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Annual 1986 Individual Income, (Thous $)
Notes.– Wage data come from 1986 SIPP. Federal and state marginal tax rates are calculated using NBER’s TAXSIM.
Counterfactual tax rate is calculated using 1986 income with 1987 tax rules. Income is binned in $100 increments.
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5 10 15 20 25 30
Annual 1985 Individaul Income, (Thous $)
Notes.– Data come SIPP. Income is binned in $100 increments.
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Table 3.3: IV Regression of Change in Pre-Tax Wage on Change in (Federal + State) Tax Rate
∆ lnw, 1987-1986
Full Full Excl Job & Excl Job &
Sample Sample Occ Chgs Occ Chgs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(1− τ̃) -0.509 -0.428 -0.345 -0.264
(S.E.) (0.089) (0.097) (0.098) (0.106)
[95%CI] [−0.683,−0.335] [−0.618,−0.238] [−0.537,−0.154] [−0.473,−0.055]
R2 0.074 0.076 0.051 0.051
N 9475 9475 6138 6138
Include Controls No Yes No Yes
First Stage ∆ ln τa, 1987-1986
∆ ln τ cf 0.628 0.589 0.670 0.634
(S.E.) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026)
R2 0.086 0.097 0.101 0.110
F-stat 888.83 50.61 692.97 39.63
Notes.– Marginal tax rate includes both federal and state tax rates. Control variables include gender interacted with
1986 marital status, age, age squared, non-white indicator, and categorical variables indicating education level and
industry. Individuals moving in and out of non-employment are also excluding when excluding job and occupation
changers.
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Table 3.4: IV Regression of Change in Pre-Tax Wage on Change in Federal Tax Rate
∆ lnw, 1987-1986
Full Full Excl Job & Excl Job &
Sample Sample Occ Chgs Occ Chgs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(1− τ̃) -0.543 -0.446 -0.406 -0.311
(S.E.) (0.107) (0.117) (0.118) (0.129)
[95%CI] [−0.753,−0.333] [−0.675,−0.217] [−0.637,−0.175] [−0.564,−0.059]
R2 0.068 0.070 0.051 0.050
N 9475 9475 6138 6138
Include Controls No Yes No Yes
First Stage ∆ ln τa, 1987-1986
∆ ln τ cf 0.570 0.533 0.606 0.571
(S.E.) (0.02) (0.02) (0.024) (0.025)
R2 0.079 0.090 0.092 0.101
F-stat 807.33 46.97 621.36 36.13
Notes.– Marginal tax rate includes only federal tax rate. Control variables include gender interacted with 1986 marital
status, age, age squared, non-white indicator, and categorical variables indicating education level and industry.
Individuals moving in and out of non-employment are also excluding when excluding job and occupation changers.
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Table 3.5: IV Results by Income
∆ lnw, 1987-1986
Low Income High Income
Full Excl Job & Full & Excl Job &
Sample Occ Chgs Sample Occ Chgs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(1− τ̃) -0.162 0.078 -0.242 -0.282
(S.E.) (0.267) (0.343) (0.134) (0.132)
[95%CI] [−0.499, 0.175] [−0.314, 0.471] [−0.504, 0.021] [−0.541,−0.022]
R2 0.023 . 0.057 0.066
N 4658 2563 4817 3575
First Stage F-stat 307.86 257.73 293.16 234.56
Notes.– Marginal tax rate includes only federal tax rate. Regression does not include controls for individual charac-
teristics. Individuals moving in and out of non-employment are also excluding when excluding job and occupation
changers.
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Table 3.6: IV Results by Gender and Marital Status
∆ ln(1− τ̃) (S.E.) 95% CI N R2 1st Stage F
Female
All -0.249 (0.117) [-0.478,-0.019] 4084 0.025 396.49
Single -0.769 (0.337) [-1.429,-0.109] 1587 0.117 73.54
Married -0.077 (0.109) [-0.292,0.137] 2497 0.006 388.69
Male
All -0.742 (0.137) [-1.012,-0.473] 5391 0.134 462.13
Single -0.645 (0.412) [-1.452,0.162] 1604 0.152 44.66
Married -0.686 (0.147) [-0.974,-0.397] 3787 0.106 459.95
Notes.– Marginal tax rate includes both federal and state tax rates. Sample includes job and occupation changers.
Regression does not include controls for individual characteristics.
CHAPTER IV
Beyond Taxes: Understanding the Labor Wedge
4.1 Introduction
A recent literature has focused on examining the determinants of the long-run be-
havior of aggregate labor hours per working-age population (H/P) within and across
countries.1 This literature’s analytical framework is based on a standard macroeco-
nomic neoclassical model. The theory behind this model implies that equilibrium
H/P is implicitly defined through a static optimality condition that equates the
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure with the marginal product
of labor. The extent to which this condition fails to hold has been coined the labor
wedge. More concisely, the labor wedge is simply a residual that captures the percent
difference between model-predicted H/P and its empirical counterpart. The labor
wedge has been found to be substantial across a large sample of OECD countries.
Recent studies focus on why the labor wedge exists and what factors can account for
it.2 These studies argue that across countries, a considerable fraction of the labor
wedge can be explained by taxes. Hence, when the standard neoclassical model is en-
hanced to incorporate taxes, the model’s predictions regarding the long-run behavior
of H/P improve considerably. However, this improvement is for all purposes limited
1See, for example, Prescott (2004) and Ohanian et al. (2008).
2See, for example, Shimer (2009) in addition to the earlier cited literature.
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to European countries. In particular, the model’s predictions are contrary to US
data, and also fail considerably for Canada. The aim of this paper is to understand
what factors, in addition to taxes, can account for the labor wedge.
In this paper, we argue that the failures of the standard model to account for the
long-run behavior of H/P in Canada and the US are not exceptions, but rather the
norm. The standard model yields an equation that implicitly defines total equilib-
rium labor hours. When testing the model, it is standard to normalize all variables
by the working-age population.3 Hence, the model is assumed to yield predictions in
terms of H/P . Of course, H/P is equal to the product of hours per worker (H/E)
and the fraction of employed individuals (E/P ). We present evidence that the stan-
dard model has no long-run explanatory power regarding E/P . However, once taxes
are accounted for, the model is capable of accurately predicting H/E. Therefore,
whenever E/P does not change much relative to H/E, which has been the case for
most European countries, the empirical behavior of H/E and H/P are indistinguish-
able and the model gives the impression of correctly predicting H/P . On the other
hand, when E/P does change considerably relative to H/E, as has been the case in
Canada and the US, the standard model implicitly reveals its limitations regarding
E/P and fails.
Since the standard model lacks predictive power regarding changes in the extensive
margin of labor supply, as we will show, the E/P ratio is absorbed by the residual.
Given that the labor wedge is implicitly defined as a residual, or the portion of
the data that predicted hours can not explain, the E/P ratio will automatically
comprise part of the labor wedge. This finding represents an important contribution
in terms of the interpretation of the labor wedge. The research in Prescott (2004)
3From now on, for simplicity we refer to population and working-age population interchangeably.
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and Ohanian et al. (2008) successfully identified that part of the labor wedge can be
attributed to ignoring taxes. We complement this research by showing that another
part of this wedge actually holds by construction. In other words, a portion of the
wedge exists because of the model’s inability to predict extensive margin changes in
labor supply.
The limitations of the standard model with regards to predicting E/P imply that
the model may be incapable of fully capturing the impact of taxes on H/P . Hence, we
develop a model that allows for heterogeneity in terms of employment status. In our
framework, a household planner maximizes the joint utility of all household members
by optimally choosing the fraction of the population that is employed, the hours
that each employed individual works, and the distribution of household consumption
across individuals conditional on employment status. We incorporate a time-varying
fixed cost associated with employment that provides a natural motivation for the
existence of voluntary non-employment.4 Our model rationalizes why the standard
model is better suited towards predicting hours per worker than hours per population.
In particular, when the choice of employment is not available, the theory is implicitly
denied the ability to endogenously make an assertion regarding the scaling of work
hours.
In addition, we focus on the model’s relevance as a tool for assessing policy. We
analyze how changes to the net-of-tax rate impact hours per worker and the number
of workers. We find that both respond in the same direction and therefore have an
unambiguous impact on hours per population, which is that hours per population are
increasing in the net-of-tax rate. We also assess the differential impact that changes
in average tax rates versus marginal taxes can have on hours per population. We
4That is, in the neoclassical spirit of market clearing, we do not focus on involuntary aspects of unemployment.
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find that a decrease in the average tax rate will lead to a decrease in hours per
worker accompanied by an increase in employment per population. Thus, a decrease
in the average tax rate could potentially have an ambiguous impact on hours per
population.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature.
In order to build intuition, in Section 4.3 we review the standard neoclassical model’s
explanatory power in terms of hours per population both with and without taxes.
In Section 4.4 we present evidence that the standard model lacks predictive power in
regards to changes in E/P . In turn, Section 4.5 develops a model in which a stand-
in household’s optimal decisions include both the extensive and intensive margins of
labor supply. This section examines the model’s implications regarding tax policy.
Then, Section 4.6 addresses the model’s ability to match data on H/E and E/P .
Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Conceptually, the labor wedge discussed in this paper stems from the analysis
in Prescott (2004). Prescott seeks to explain differences in hours per population
between the US and a set of European countries. Using aggregate data, Prescott
derives effective tax rates for a group of OECD countries between 1970 and 1974,
and also between 1993 and 1996. He then uses the first-order conditions derived from
a standard neoclassical model with taxes to generate data on hours per population.
Prescott argues that over his reference periods, cross-country differences in effective
tax rates can account for a considerable fraction of the level differences in hours
per population. However, he notes that the model predicts that in the US, H/P
should have gone down, when in reality this ratio has gone up. He suggests that this
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failure of the model owes to the fact that the US experienced an increase in married
women’s labor force participation along with a flattening of the tax schedule during
the 1980’s. Thus, the marginal tax rate for large changes in income when moving to
a two-earner household was significantly higher in the earlier period compared to the
later period even though the calculated marginal tax rate used for predicting hours
remained the same.
Alesina et al. (2005) argue that the assumptions underpinning the model in
Prescott (2004) actually drive the results. In particular, they argue that the choice
of log utility function as well as an implied labor supply elasticity with respect to the
tax rate roughly equal to 3 are what allow for taxes to explain most of the differences
in labor hours across countries. Moreover, the authors suggest that an omitted vari-
able in Prescott’s analysis is cross-country differences in the degree of unionization.
Alesina et al. posit that in the absence of changes in market regulations imposed by
unions, changes in effective tax rates would not have affected hours worked to the
extent implied by Prescott (2004).
More recently, Ohanian et al. (2008) extend the analysis in Prescott (2004) by
studying a larger set of countries over a longer time frame and using a slightly differ-
ent functional form for utility. The analysis uses annual effective tax rates derived in
McDaniel (2007). This allows for a broad and detailed documentation of the long-run
behavior of H/P , as well as extensive testing of the standard macroeconomic model’s
explanatory power. Ohanian et al. agree with Prescott in that augmenting the neo-
classical model with taxes can broadly account for changes within country changes in
H/P over time. This conclusion is robust to controlling for institutional differences.
However, Ohanian et al. note that for Canada and the US, model-generated hours
per population fail to match their empirical counterparts.
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Shimer (2009) reviews literature on the labor wedge. The central points of
Shimer’s paper involve shifting attention to the cyclical behavior of the labor wedge.
In particular, he backs out the US labor wedge and notes its strong procyclicality. He
then considers plausible explanations for this procyclicality. As argued in Prescott
(2004) and Ohanian et al. (2008), a fraction of the labor wedge can be accounted
for by taxes. Thus, one explanation for the cyclical behavior of the labor wedge
are cyclical fluctuations in taxes. However, Shimer argues that this explanation is
unreasonable as it would be consistent with taxes being strongly countercyclical.
This means that taxes would increase substantially during recessions. Instead, he
suggests that a more plausible explanation for these cyclical fluctuations may involve
noncompetitive aspects of the labor market.
This paper shifts attention to the puzzle created by the model’s predictions for
the US and Canada. We search for explanations of the discrepancy within the model
itself by disaggregating the model’s predictions and examining the extent to which
it is capable of predicting behavior on multiple dimensions. To motivate our study
on the labor wedge, we start by presenting additional background information on
its existence and the impact of including taxes in the standard neoclassical model.
Also through this discussion, we will highlight the failure of the model to account
for labor supply behavior in the US and Canada.
4.3 The Labor Wedge
In a standard neoclassical macroeconomic model, setting labor supply equal to
labor demand yields a straightforward equation for hours worked. Hours are derived
to be a function of output, consumption, and the structural parameters of the model.
It is therefore possible to generate a predicted series of hours using aggregate data
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on consumption and output, along with assumed parameter values. The extent to
which the predicted hours differ from the actual data on hours is captured by the
“labor wedge”. The labor wedge is defined as the ratio of model predicted hours
and the actual data on hours. If the model perfectly predicted hours, then this ratio
would be one. Realistically, many of the assumptions of the standard neoclassical
model are likely to not hold. However, the exercise of comparing the generated hours
with the data is useful for measuring the accuracy of the model with its simplifying
assumptions. In what follows, we derive the equation for labor hours that stems
from the standard neoclassical model. For ease of exposition, we focus on Canada,
France, Germany, and the US to measure the accuracy of the model’s predictions.
These countries are representative of the differences that earlier research has found
between European and North-American countries in terms of hours per working-age
population. Whereas in Europe, on average, H/P has decreased slightly over the
last several decades, in North America H/P has slightly increased. We calculate
the resulting labor wedge when the equation is applied to data for the US, Canada,
France and Germany over the span of roughly 40 years. We then relax the assumption
that tax distortions are non-existent in the standard model and re-derive the model
assuming a broad set of taxes on labor, capital, investment, and consumption. The
effective tax rate that had been previously excluded from the standard model factors
into the prediction for hours worked.
4.3.1 The Standard Model
The standard neoclassical macroeconomic model assumes a representative house-
hold that maximizes its present discounted value of utility subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint. The infinitely lived household derives utility from household con-








WtHt +RtKt ≥ Ct + It.
Above, β is the discount factor, W is the real wage, I is investment, and the price
of consumption is normalized to 1. The household is assumed to own the economy’s
capital, K, and a representative firm rents the capital from the household at a rental
rate of R. The capital accumulation equation is given by
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt,
where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
Following Shimer (2009), we assume that the household’s instantaneous utility is
given by







where ε is the Frisch (marginal value of real wealth held constant) elasticity of labor
supply, and γ is a positive constant.5
Output Y is determined by a representative firm with Cobb-Douglas production
function






where α ∈ (0, 1) and Z is technology. The representative firm chooses capital and
5The assumed functional form for instantaneous utility differs from that used in Prescott (2004) and Ohanian et
al. (2008). However, as shown in Shimer (2009), the choice of utility function has little impact on both the qualitative
and quantitative results. Chetty (2009) offers a detailed comparison between the Frisch elasticity, which is commonly
used in macroeconomic literature, and the compensated elasticity, which is frequently used in the public finance and
labor literature.
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Assuming all markets are perfectly competitive, in equilibrium, labor supply must
equal labor demand. Therefore, combining the household’s first-order conditions for
labor supply and consumption with the firm’s first-order condition for labor demand








where NM stands for neoclassical model.6 This is a static condition that, in theory,
must hold within any time period.
There are diverse ways to test the validity of models such as structural estimation
and numerical simulation. However, given that the condition in equation (4.2) is
static, we can easily test its accuracy by using aggregate data on output and con-
sumption to generate the model’s prediction for hours worked, subject to choices for
the model’s parameters. This approach has been used in past literature including
Parkin (1988), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and Mulligan (2002). The extent
to which the model’s predicted hours HNM differ from actual hours HACTUAL is





The difference between the labor wedge and unity, −∆t, measures the percent devi-
ation between actual hours and model hours. We follow Prescott (2004), Ohanian
et al. (2008), and Shimer (2009) in focusing on the long-run behavior of labor hours
6The notation := means that the object on the left-hand side of this symbol is defined by the object on its
right-hand side.
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by using yearly data. In order to gauge the performance of the standard model we
compare model-predicted hours to actual hours.
A country’s model-predicted hours HNM are generated using equation (4.2) as
follows. As is standard in the literature, we normalize all within-country variables
by its working-age population; thus, the standard model is assumed to predict hours
per working age population.7 We use annual data from 1960 through 2006, detailed
in Appendix A. Using data on real output and consumption, and assuming a value
for ε, we generate the series (Yt/Ct)
ε
1+ε for each country. The final version of model
hours requires scaling this series by (1− α) /γ. Let κ = (1− α) /γ. In the model, κ
is constant over time. Therefore, we can use κ as a free parameter to calibrate the













which implicitly allows for cross-country heterogeneity in κ. Hence, for each country
we choose the scaling parameter κ such that mean model-generated hours HNM is
equal to that country’s mean actual hours HACTUAL.
Although micro estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply usually imply val-
ues of ε less than unity, macro estimates are on average slightly higher than 1. Some
studies develop explanations by which these difference can be reconciled (Chetty
(2009a), Rogerson and Wallenius (2009)). However, a line of research, especially
that regarding real business cycle analysis, tends to impute ε by choosing a value for
this parameter that makes the model-predicted cyclical fluctuations in labor hours
most closely match the cyclical fluctuations in the true data. This approach leads to
much higher choices of ε than those mentioned earlier. A similar approach regard-
ing the trend behavior of labor hours rather than their cyclical fluctuations leads
7From here on out we will use working age population and population interchangeably.
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Prescott (2004) to impute ε = 3, and Shimer (2009) to impute ε = 4.
We compare actual hours per working-age population with model H/P generated
alternatively with ε = 1 and ε = 4. Figure 4.1 shows the model generated hours per
working age population with ε set to 1 and and to 4. As noted above, the appro-
priate parameter value for the Frisch labor supply elasticity is debatable. However,
the results in Figure 4.1 show that the values for ε under consideration make little
difference in terms of their effect on the trend behavior of model-generated hours.
Henceforth, we follow Shimer (2009) and set ε equal to 4. Figure 4.2 shows the
actual hours per working age population along with their model-generated counter-
parts using ε equal to 4. The figure illustrates that although the model performs
well when predicting the trend behavior in Canada, this is not the case in the other
countries. The residual of the model’s predictions relative to the data is captured
by the labor wedge graphed in Figure 4.3. The models’s accuracy is best when the
wedge is closest to one.
4.3.2 The Model with Taxes
That trends in hours per working age population are vastly different across coun-
tries stimulated interest into potential causes for reconciling this stylized fact. One
explanation is that taxes contribute to these differences both across countries and
within-country over time. Thus a growing body of literature (Prescott (2004), Oha-
nian et al. (2008), Shimer (2009)) incorporates taxation into the standard neoclassical
model. This literatures argues that a fraction of the labor wedge is accounted for
by taxes. Below, we rederive the equation for labor hours including a broad set of
taxes.
Following past literature, we assume that the statutory incidence of all taxes is
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on consumers making the household’s budget constraint
(1 + τ ct )Ct + (1 + τ
i
t )It ≤ (1− τht )WtHt + (1− τ kt )RtKt.
Above, τ c, τ i, τh, and τ k, are respectively consumption, investment, labor, and











τh + τ c
)
/ (1 + τ c) is the effective tax rate and NMT stands for neoclas-
sical model with taxes. The tax-inclusive model reveals that (1 − τ)
ε
1+ε is included
in the labor wedge of the standard model when taxes are ignored. Hence when taxes





We generate model hours for the period 1960-2006 using equation (4.3) normalized
by the working-age population, along with data on C and Y . Following Ohanian et al.
(2008), we use the effective marginal tax series created by McDaniel (2007), which
includes calculated taxes on both income and consumption. McDaniel’s methods
are similar to that of Mendoza et al. (1994), though the data is mainly derived
from national accounts publications. Both income and expenditure data and tax
revenue are all categorized into labor or capital income and consumption or private
investment. Tax rates are then calculated by dividing the tax revenue by either
the income or expenditure for that category. This method for calculating tax rates
has the nice feature that taxes can be derived independent of tax return data using
only aggregate data. However, a trade off is made where strong assumptions are
required for classifying the data into categories, which necessary impact the results.
An addition drawback from this method is that the calculated labor income tax
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rates are average tax rates rather than marginal tax rates. However, McDaniel
provides a comparison of the average tax rates and average marginal tax rates series
calculated from past studies for the US and finds a similar trend behavior in each of
the two series. The McDaniel (2007) tax data is summarized in Appendix A.8 The
normalized model is once again assumed to predict hours per working-age population.
To generate model hours, we continue to set ε to 4. For each country in our OECD
sample we generate the series ((1− τ)Yt/Ct)
ε
1+ε . In this case note that for any given













Figure 4.4 presents model-generated and actual hours per working-age popula-
tion. For comparison, Figure 4.5 shows the wedges generated by the standard model
and the wedges generated by standard model augmented with taxes. The wedge
generated by the model with taxes is closer to one for France and Germany. This
highlights the improvement made in terms of predicting the long-run behavior of
H/P relative to the standard model for these countries. However, as noted by both
Prescott (2004) and Ohanian et al. (2008), when taxes are included, the model’s
predictions for the US and Canada fail to account for the true data.9
4.4 The Role of the E/P Ratio
Given that H/P = (H/E) · (E/P ), understanding why the standard model with
taxes fares poorly for some countries may be illuminated by understanding on which
margin it is failing: H/E, E/P , or both. Thus, it is useful to disentangle the relative
influence of H/E and E/P in shaping the observed patterns in H/P . Figure 4.6,
8See McDaniel (2007) for a more detailed explanation for how tax rates are calculated.
9We calculate a sum of the squared differences, where the difference is between the actual data on hours and the
model predicted hours with and without taxes. The sum of squared differences is lower when taxes are included in
the model for France and Germany, but higher when taxes are included in the model for Canada and the US.
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shows the actual hours per population for Canada, France, Germany, and the US.
The graph illustrates the behavior of H/P , had E/P remained fixed at its 1960 value
and only H/E changed. Also included is the behavior of H/P , had H/E remained
fixed at its 1960 value and only E/P changed. In Canada and the US, the hours
per population have been increasing while hours per worker have been decreasing.
Thus, in Canada and the US, the long-run trend in H/P is predominately driven by
changes in E/P . This stands in contrast to France and Germany, where both hours
per population and hours per worker have been decreasing while E/P has remained
mostly constant.
Recall that the standard model with taxes was shown to provide accurate predic-
tions of H/P for France and Germany, but not for Canada and the US. Combined
with the patterns in Figure 4.6, this suggests that it may be the case that the stan-
dard model is inherently incapable of predicting changes in employment and instead
a better predictor of hours per worker. If this is true, when E/P does not change
much relative to H/E, then the model will give the impression of being successful in
predicting H/P only as a matter of coincidence.
The theoretical predictions stemming from NM and NMT regarding equilibrium
hours of work do not specify whether they are in per worker or per population terms.
However, it has become standard in the literature to normalize all variables in the
model by population, P . As noted above, the model is therefore assumed to predict
H/P . Normalizing by population implicitly assumes that all household members
equally share consumption utility as well as work-hours disutility. In both the NM
and NMT, assuming that disutility from work-hours is shared across the population
is the same as assuming both that everyone works the same amount of hours and
that the entire population is employed.
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That is, suppose that the model’s prediction for hours were explicitly in per-worker
terms. In this case, model hours per worker can be generated for each country by
creating the series ((1− α)Yt/γCt)
ε













Figure 4.7 shows the actual hours per worker for Canada, France, Germany, and
the US along with hours per worker generated using equation (4.5). If the model
is assumed to predict H/E, as in equation (4.5), then the model-generated data is
virtually identical to the actual data.
If the standard model with taxes provides good predictions of hours per worker,
then it should also be the case that multiplying these hours by a correct prediction
of E/P would yield correct predictions of H/P for all countries, including the US
and Canada. Unfortunately, the standard model only provides an equation for labor
hours. However, if equation (4.5) is a good approximation to actual behavior of
H/E, then multiplying the implied model hours by each country’s actual E/P ratio













where H/E are model-generated hours per worker as implied by equation (4.5).
Hybrid hours per working-age population as well as actual H/P are shown in Figure
4.8 . Hybrid hours per working-age population perform extremely well in accounting
for actual H/P for each country. In particular, for Canada and the US, the trend
behavior of H/P is correct.
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The analysis thus far, suggests that the standard neoclassical model when it in-
cludes taxes, is better suited for predicting H/E rather than H/P . The degree to
which this is true can be gauged by one final test. If the standard neoclassical model
is incapable of predicting E/P , then E/P will in practice fall into the labor wedge
defined in equation (4.4). Figure 4.9 graphs the labor wedge implied by equation
(4.4) along with each country’s E/P ratio. Except for a scaling constant, the long-
run behavior of these two series track one another surprisingly well. This suggests
that a significant fraction of the labor wedge in equation (4.4) is the E/P ratio.
Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008), and Shimer (2009) correctly identify taxes
as part of the labor wedge. Our research complements these previous findings in that
we show the residual generated by the standard model with taxes is comprised of the
E/P ratio. This is largely due to the fact that the standard model lacks predictive
power for changes in employment.
Our conclusions have mixed implications for the success of the standard model.
The bad news is that successes attributed to the standard model with taxes regard-
ing predictions of the long-run behavior of H/P exist when the E/P ratio does not
change much relative to H/E. In other words, the model is successful when the
behaviors of H/E and H/P are virtually indistinguishable. This gives the model the
appearance of correctly predicting H/P . However, when E/P does change signifi-
cantly relative to H/E, as has been the case over the last several decades in Canada
and the US, the model’s predictions fail. For example, suppose all countries had
experienced comparable changes in E/P relative to H/E as Canada and the US.
Then, research based on the tax-enhanced standard model might have incorrectly
implied that taxes have a negligible impact on predicting the long-run behavior of
work hours. On the other hand, the good news are two-fold. First, our analysis
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shows that the current theory produces a relatively accurate prediction for H/E,
which implies a strong theoretical understanding of the determinants for this vari-
able. Second, we show that the E/P ratio accounts for a large portion of the trend
behavior of the labor wedge that remains after taxes are accounted for in the stan-
dard model. This is helpful for guiding the development of future research on the
behavior of H/P , which is necessary for understanding the implications of tax policy.
Tax policy can have differential impacts on the extensive and intensive margins for
labor supply decisions. In particular, the average tax rate is associated with changes
on the extensive margin while the marginal tax rate impacts the intensive margin.
Thus in the next section, we develop a model that disentangles the household’s choice
between employment and labor hours. We then analyze how each margin of labor
supply is impacted by changes in the marginal tax rate and additionally the impact
of changes in the average and marginal tax rates when they differ.
4.5 Heterogeneity
We have argued that the equation for hours implied by the standard theory is
more successful for predicting hours per worker rather than hours per working-age
population. When the model is normalized by employment, the consumption utility
will also be on a per worker basis. On the other hand, if the model is normalized by
population, then a within-household distribution is implicitly established where all
household members share utility from consumption and disutility from work-hours
equally. In other words, normalizing by population establishes that all household
members consume the same amount and work the same number of hours. This
implicitly dampens the representative household’s labor disutility since aggregate
hours are normalized by a group that includes non-workers.
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The differences stemming from choice in normalization highlight an aspect of the
model that is lacking, which is its ability to distinguish between the intensive and
extensive margin. As an alternative, we develop a model that explicitly incorporates
the possibility that some individuals are employed and others (voluntarily) are not.10
That is, we allow for heterogeneity in employment status. If there were no cost to
employment, then all individuals would be employed in order to maximize utility.
Thus, we include a fixed cost to employment that motivates the heterogeneity in
employment status. In our model, hours per worker and employment are disentan-
gled as choice variables to be optimized by a household planner. The result is an
equation for equilibrium labor hours in terms of hours per worker. Interestingly, this
equation is almost identical to the one stemming from the employment-normalized
standard model. In fact, we show that the hours equation stemming from both the
population-normalized and the employment-normalized models are special cases of
the hours equation from the model developed below. This model provides a theoret-
ical rationalization for our earlier finding that the standard model is relatively better
at predicting hours per worker.
In addition, we derive conditions to show the impact that taxes and the employ-
ment fixed cost have on both hours per worker and employment. We show that the
dominating effect depends on the household planner’s respective weights on employed
and non-employed individuals. We then continue our discussion by relaxing the as-
sumption of a flat tax on wage income to allow for a more realistic graduated wage
income tax. By allowing for a graduated wage tax, we can isolate the differential
impact that average verses marginal taxes have on labor supply. In particular, we
derive conditions for how both average tax rates and marginal tax rates each impact
10In the spirit of market clearing, we focus on non-employment rather than unemployment.
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hours per worker and employment.
4.5.1 Theory










where c is the individual’s consumption, φ is a fixed cost associated with employment,
and h is the individual’s work hours. As before γ is a labor disutility parameter and
ε is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.11 Note that the within-period utility of a
non-employed individual is simply given by ln (ct).
In standard representative agent macroeconomic models, the population consists
of a continuum of infinitely divisible individuals that is normalized to 1. Given that
individuals are assumed to be identical, the household’s instantaneous utility is equiv-
alent to that of a single representative agent multiplied by the number of individuals
(i.e., 1). The model we develop maintains the assumption of an infinitely divisible
population (that we will normalize to unity), but extends the household planner’s
problem to include the possibility for non-employment. Let P denote the population
and, as in the standard model, assume that all individuals in the population are
grouped in a single household in which resources are pooled. We assume individuals
are altruistic and their joint objective is to maximize the household’s utility. Thus,
suppose a household planner maximizes the joint utility U of the household’s P mem-
bers, taking prices, and government policy, as given. In particular, the household
11Of course, modeling the determinants of employment is a non-trivial task as idiosyncratic worker aspects and
search frictions are just some of the many potential factors that can affect this variable. Here, we have taken a
parsimonious approach by assuming that the disutility from employment enters the household’s utility as a per worker
time-varying fixed cost. With the exception of allowing for a time-varying employment fixed cost, the instantaneous
utility function we use is the same as that used in Kimball and Shapiro (2008).
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Above, ψE is the weight the planner places on the utility of employed individuals,
E is the number of employed individuals, CE is the fraction of total household
consumption, C, that each employed individual receives, H is total work hours,
ψN = 1 − ψE is the weight the household places on the utility on non-employed
individuals, and CN is the fraction of total household consumption that each non-
employed individual receives. All other variables as well as the capital accumulation
equation are described earlier in the paper in Section 4.3.12
The choice of employment versus non-employment matters on two important di-
mensions. First, note that since non-employed individuals do not work, they con-
tribute no labor disutility to U . Also, what matters for total labor income is total
labor hours H. Once there is a choice between employment E and hours per worker
H/E, where explicit disutility from the former is linear and from the latter is convex,
the decision over which margin to adjust total hours given changes in economic condi-
tions becomes relevant. Indeed, note that the relative disutilities of hours-per-worker
and employment change at different rates.
Let λt be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household planner’s prob-
lem. We continue to focus on the labor market. The first-order conditions for
12Of course, the number of people employed is not a continuous variable. However, in this context, by choosing
employment, the household planner is implicitly choosing the fraction of the population that is employed. Therefore
treating employment as a continuous variable is inoccuous.
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consumption, total work hours, and employment, after rearranging, imply that
ψEEt/C
E
t = λt (1 + τ
c
t ) , (4.6)

































Combining the consumption first-order conditions, it follows that within any period
CNt =
ψN (Pt − Et)
ψEEt
CEt .
Using this, and the fact that the sum of CEt and C
N
t must equal total household
consumption, Ct, implies that






N (Pt − Et)
)
is the fraction of total household consumption that the planner assigns to employed
individuals.
In order to close the model, we must once more consider the firm’s problem. The
firm chooses total work hours H and capital K in order to maximize




1−α −WtHt −RtKt. (4.11)
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The first-order conditions for hours per worker and employment both result in
(1− α)ZtKαt (Ht)
−α = Wt
=⇒ (1− α)Yt = WtHt. (4.12)























where τ is the effective tax rate, defined earlier in the paper in Section 4.3.2. Sub-














where ht = Ht/Et is hours per worker.
The right-hand side of equation (4.13) defines the hours per worker that are
theoretically consistent with the household’s optimal choice of employment, taxes,
and output to consumption ratio. Note that as ψE → 1,
(
ψEEt + ψ
N (Pt − Et)
)
/ψEEt → 1.
Therefore, as ψE → 1, equation (4.13) converges to the prediction of hours that the
standard model enhanced with taxes yields when all variables are normalized by the
level of employment. On the other hand, when ψE = ψN = 0.5, slight rearrangement
of equation (4.13) implies that the prediction for hours is the same as for the model
with all variables normalized by population. Thus, for ψE = ψN = 0.5, the first-order
condition from our model is the equivalent to that of the standard model normalized
by population.
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We now derive an expression for employment per population. Consider once more
equation (4.9). Substituting in for CEt , C
N
























Further rearrangement implies that









(1− ln (Ct))− ψEγφt, (4.14)
where













N (Pt − Et)
))
.
The right-hand of equation (4.14) implicitly defines the level of employment that
is theoretically consistent with the household’s optimal choices regarding aggregate
consumption C and hours per worker h, given the employment fixed cost φ. Note






t − (1− ln (Ct))− γφt,
which implies complementarity between employment and hours per worker and, as
expected that employment is decreasing in φ.13
4.5.2 Comparative Statics
In the standard model, the impact of the effective tax rate is captured through
only one margin of adjustment – aggregate hours worked. If the effective tax rate were
13 Intuitively, the non-employment state can be thought of as equivalent to resting. Although, some non-
employment is optimal at the household level, the utility of employed and non-employed individuals differs, which
begs the question: why would some individuals accept a relatively lower utility level and not deviate from the
household planner’s decision? Because the household utility is maximized by a (benevolent) household planner,
the resulting utility is at its max. In terms of individual utilities, the household could engage in an optimization
subproblem, which we ignore for simplicity. The optimal solution to the subproblem would be rotating individuals
between states of non-employment and employment so that everyone rests and works the same amount. This would
allow no one household member to be stuck forever in non-employment with different consumption. In other words,
the individual expected flow utility streams would be equalized across the population.
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increased, then aggregate hours would respond by decreasing. In our model, there
are two margins that can adjust to changes in the effective tax rate including both
hours per worker and changes in the number of workers. To examine how changes in
the effective tax rate and the fixed cost associated with employment impact hours per
worker and the number of workers, we totally differentiate the equations presented
above. We can then isolate four objects of interest, which are the elasticities of both
hours per worker and employment with respect to the net-of-tax rate and the fixed
cost, holding all other variables fixed.
As shown in Appendix B,(
1 +
ψNψE







d ln (ht) =
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(ψE − ψN) (Et/Pt)
)
d ln (Ct/Pt) . (4.16)
This means that hours per worker are increasing in the employment fixed costs,
φ, while employment is decreasing in φ. This result intuitively illustrates the sub-
stitution between hours per worker and employment. Both hours per worker and
employment are increasing in the net-of-tax rate, (1− τ). Thus, an increase in the
effective tax rate τ causes the household to decrease both hours per worker and
employment, ceteris paribus.
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From equations (4.15) and (4.16), we can obtain elasticities of hours per worker









































Given a 1 percent increase in φ the percentage employment decrease is greater than






























⇐⇒ ψE > ψN .
Thus, the employment response to a change in fixed cost is unambiguously greater
than that of hours per worker when ψE > ψN .
Next, we consider the elasticities of hours per worker and of employment with
respect to the net-of-tax rate (1− τ), again holding all other variables fixed. The










































This means a 1 percent increase in (1− τ) causes a greater percentage increase in
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Thus, the relative response between hours per worker and employment to a tax
change is ultimately ambiguous. For example, consider a country with ε = 4, Et/Pt =
















































This suggests that the relative magnitudes depend on γ and in this particular exam-
ple, for γ ≥ 1/25.1487, an increase in (1− τt) will cause a greater percentage increase
in participation than hours per worker as long as ψE is not particularly small.
4.5.3 Average vs. Marginal Tax Rates
So far, we have assumed that wage income is taxed at a flat rate, making the
marginal tax rate on wage income equivalent to its respective average tax rate. How-
ever, the true tax system may be a graduated tax schedule on personal income, where
the marginal tax rate increases with income. For simplicity, consider a graduated
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schedule for wage income with two marginal tax rates, τA and τB, where τB > τA.
The lower rate τA, applies to the first WH1 dollars of wage income earned and
WH1 is the income cut off where the marginal rate changes, while τ
B applies to
the next W (H − H1) dollars. Also, to isolate responses stemming from differences
in the average and marginal tax rates on wage income, we focus on the case where
τ c = τ i = τ k = 0. The representative household’s budget constraint is now written
as,






+ It ≤ WtHt −WtH1τA +RtKt + Tt






+ It ≤ WtHt −WtH1τA −Wt(Ht −H1)τB +RtKt + Tt.
Thus, a graduated tax on wage income induces a kink in the household’s budget
constraint. This means the maximization is non-differentiable at WH1. Nonethe-
less, the first-order conditions will remain valid for each segment of the household’s
problem. We focus on the maximization that occurs on the segment where H > H1,
as it highlights the household’s problem when the marginal tax rate is not equivalent
to the average tax rate.
Given that the average and marginal tax rates are no longer equivalent, we can
analyze the impact of the average tax rate on h and E/P holding the marginal tax







where τB is the marginal tax rate for H > H1. If there is an increase in τ
A with no
subsequent change in τB, then for H > H1, this represents an increase in the average
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tax rate with no change to the marginal tax rate. The household budget constraint
can be rewritten as















Given that WH1 is constant, WH1(τ
B − τA) is also constant. This means that
changes to the average tax rate that do not impact the marginal tax rate will have
only a pure income effect. For instance, a decrease to τA will allow the household
to increase total consumption for a given amount of investment. Thus, the impact
of the average tax rate on h, and E/P is realized through changes in consumption.
Equations 4.15 and 4.16 show that changes to consumption impact both changes to
h and E/P where an increase in consumption leads to a decease in h and an increase
E/P . However, a 1% increase in C/P will cause a greater percentage-wise increase





























⇐⇒ ψE > ψN .
Thus, a decrease in τA, which in turn decreased τ̄ , will lead to an overall increase
in H/P even though h falls, if the household planner weights the employed greater
than the non-employed.
To analyze the impact of the marginal tax rate, suppose τB decreased, while
τA increased, keeping the average tax rate constant. This assumption allows us
to abstract from the additional income effect that would occur if the average tax
rate had also changed. Conditional on H > H1, the planner seeks to maximize the
household’s utility subject to the budget constraint with varying marginal rates. The
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After taking first-order conditions for consumption and setting labor supply equiva-
lent to labor demand, we obtain a new hours per worker equation in terms of only













The equations used in the comparative statics above can be used to study the impact
of the marginal tax rate on h and E/P , though replacing (1− τ) with (1− τB), since
we have assumed only wage taxes. The comparative statics illustrated that a decrease
in τB (and thus an increase in (1− τB) will increase both h and E/P . The response
with a larger percentage increase is ambiguous and depends largely on γ, which
represents the distaste for working.
Overall we find that a decrease in the average tax rate, holding the marginal tax
rate constant, increases the overall H/P ratio by increasing E/P more than the
fall in h when ψE > ψN . A decrease in the marginal tax rate, holding the average
tax rate fixed, will increase both h and E/P . Although the relative magnitudes of
their responses is ambiguous, the overall effect will be a subsequent increase to H/P .
The sensitivity of h and E/P with respect to the average and marginal tax rates
depends on ψE/ψN because the weights influence how much additional disutility rhe
household endures by increasing employment relative to increasing hours per worker.
4.6 Application of the Model
Relative to the standard model, our theory adds two additional parameters that
affect the behavior of hours per population: ψE (the household planner’s weight
125
placed on employed individuals) and φ (the fixed cost endured by employed indi-
viduals). Although we are unable to empirically estimate either parameter, we can
examine what values for each of these parameters are consistent with the observed
data.
4.6.1 Hours Per Worker
As shown above, ψE is an important parameter for determining the direction of
several comparative statics. In order to discern the values of ψE consistent with
each country’s data, we generate model predicted hours per worker using empirical
measures for the variables on the right-hand side of equation (4.13). We apply the
same data generating methods detailed in Section 4.3. Figures 4.10-4.13 show the
actual and model-predicted hours per worker for Canada, France, Germany, and
the US. The model-predicted hours per worker are graphed for ψE ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
For each country, the model-predicted hours per worker are a closer match to their
empirical counterparts as ψE increases.
Table 4.2 extends the overall analysis to account for 15 OECD countries for which
the McDaniel (2007) tax series is available and also considers a wider set of values
for ψE. The second column shows the mean of the annual percent changes in actual
hours per worker from 1960 through 2006 in each country. The remainder of the
table shows the mean annual percent change in hours per worker generated using
equation (4.13) over the same period and for different values of ψE. The boxed
values represent model-predicted results that are relatively better at matching the
actual data. For two thirds of the countries, values of ψE ≥ 0.5 are associated with
predictions that better match the data. The exceptions are Belgium, Japan, Spain,
and Switzerland, where ψE = 0.01 is a relatively better fit, and Italy where ψE = 0.25
is a relatively better fit. The relatively better fits for Canada and the US are at the
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other end of the spectrum with ψE = 0.75 and ψE = 0.99, respectively. The results
in Table 4.2 suggest that, on average and across countries, households tend to act as
if optimization is carried out by a household planner that puts a relatively heavier
weight on the utility of employed individuals.
The substantial cross-country variation in the implied measures of ψE that best
reconcile the model with the data is somewhat surprising. Although modeling the
factors that determine the planner’s weights is beyond the scope of this paper, it
may be helpful to think of the ratio ψE/ψN as reflecting factors affecting the relative
differences in the utility among employed and non-employed individuals that are
not explicitly accounted for by the model. For example, extra utility arising from
work activities that are enjoyable would raise the relative utility stemming from
employment through channels that we have not modeled. Future research may focus
on endogenizing the household planner’s weights to further understand these large
differences across countries.
For the purpose of comparison to the neoclassical model enhanced with taxes
(NMT), Table 4.4 presents the mean of the year-to-year percent changes in actual
H/P , H/E, and E/P for the period 1960-2004. Also included are the predictions
of NMT regarding H/P . The fifth and sixth columns of Table 4.4 show NMT’s
predictions relative to the actual data on H/P and H/E, respectively. When NMT
is assumed to predict H/P , on average, it explains around 60% of the data. On the
other hand, when NMT is assumed to predict H/E, its explanatory power improves
considerably, on average explaining 74% of the data. This improvement is especially
large for countries like the US and Canada where there have been large changes in
E/P . The second to last column of Table 4.4 shows our model’s best predictions
regarding H/E from Table 4.2. The last column shows our model’s predictions
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relative to the actual data on H/E. On average, our model can account for roughly
84% of the the data.
4.6.2 Employment
As shown above, the trend behavior of E/P can have an important impact on
the trend behavior of H/P . Since changes in φ directly affect the determination of
E/P , it is of interest to understand the relative changes in φ necessary to reconcile
the model with the data. Using equation (4.14), we can generate the fixed cost series
















It is not obvious what γ should be set to, or for that matter if it is appropriate
or not to assume that γ varies across countries. However, since γ is assumed to be
a time invariant scaling parameter, we can focus on the series φt/φ1960. Hence, for a
given country we scale the model-generated fixed costs series by its 1960 value. Table
4.3 shows the actual mean of the year-to-year percent change in the E/P ratios for
the same period and countries as in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 also shows the mean of
the year-to-year percent changes in φ, scaled by its 1960 value, that are consistent
with explaining changes in E/P for different values of ψE. For ψE ≥ 0.25, the
model suggests that the mean of the year-to-year percent changes in φt should have
decreased on average less than 1% per year in order to account for the data. This
means that on a year-to-year basis a relatively small decline in the costs associated
with employment is sufficient to reconcile the model with the data. Given that the
fixed costs are calculated as a residual, they can also include factors affecting hours
behavior that the model ignores. That the implied annual changes in fixed cost are
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relatively small suggests that the model may indeed accurately account for major
determinants that drive changes in labor supply behavior.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper questions the ability of the standard neoclassical model augmented
with taxes to predict hours per population across country. Past work has argued
that by including taxes in the standard neoclassical model, much of the long-run
differences in hours per population both within and across country can be accounted
for. However, two countries stand out as exceptions – Canada and the US. We delve
deeper into these puzzling exceptions and highlight that unlike the other countries
studied, Canada and the US both experienced large increases in their employment
to population ratio. Upon further inspection, we conclude that the failure of the
standard neoclassical model with taxes to predict hours per population in Canada
and the US stems from its inability to predict accurate changes in the employment
to population ratio.
After identifying the shortcomings of the model with taxes with respect to em-
ployment changes, we develop a model that explicitly incorporates employment as
a choice variable. In our model, a household planner maximizes the weighted util-
ity over employed and non-employed individuals. Our model features a fixed cost
associated with employment. This fixed cost is such that the household’s optimal
decisions with regards to aggregate hours per population involve a trade-off between
the (linear) costs associated with employment and the (convex) costs associated with
work hours. This leads hours and employment to be substitutes with regards to the
employment fixed cost. In particular, an increase in the fixed cost induces a decrease
in employment and an increase in hours per worker. We find that as the planner
129
increases the weight on the utility of employed individuals, the relative magnitude of
changes in employment given a change in fixed costs also increases. Thus, when the
weight on employed individuals is greater, the impact on hours per population will be
dominated by the employment response with respect to changes in the fixed cost to
employment. In other words, for a large enough weight on employed individuals, an
increase in fixed cost will lead to a decrease in hours per population, which is driven
by a decrease in the employment per population. This decrease in hours per popula-
tion is mitigated by the increase in hours per worker. We also analyze changes to the
net-of-tax rate and find that the relative magnitude between the hours per worker
response and the employment response is ambiguous. However, both respond in the
same direction and therefore have an unambiguous impact on hours per population,
which is that hours per population move in the same direction as the net-of-tax rate.
Additionally, we highlight the model’s relevance as a tool for analyzing policy by
exploring the differential impact that changes in average tax rates versus marginal
taxes can have on hours per population. We find that a decrease in the average
tax rate leads to a decrease in hours per worker, while employment per population
increases. Similar to a change in employment fixed cost, the dominating response
will depend on how the household planner weights employed individuals. Thus,
a decrease in the average tax rate could potentially lead to either an increase or
decrease in hours per population. This finding is particularly interesting in the US,
where there were large decreases in the average tax rate, with increases in hours per
population. When viewing each component of hours per population separately, as in
Figure 4.6, hours per worker and employment per population in the US behave as
the model predicts, with hours per worker falling while employment per population
is rising.
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Finally, we reconcile our model with the data to obtain reasonable parameter val-
ues for the household planner’s respective weights on employed and non-employed
individuals and for the long-run behavior of the employment fixed cost. If the house-
hold planner weights employed and non-employed individuals equally, then the pre-
dictions of our model regarding labor supply are the same as the standard model
with population as the normalization. However, as the weight on employed indi-
viduals tends to one, our model gives the same prediction as the standard model if
it were assumed to predict hours per worker. By allowing for an intermediate case
on weights other than 0.5 or 1, we find the model best matches the data on hours
per worker when the planner’s weight on employed individuals is between .5 and 1.
However, there are exceptions for some countries, which suggests that by allowing
for more flexibility in the weights, we can derive more accurate predictions of hours.
In terms of the the fixed cost to employment, we find that it varies little over time.
Thus, only small changes in the fixed cost are necessary to explain long-run changes
in the employment to population ratio.
Intuitively, the large differences across countries in the planner’s weights may cap-
ture differences in non-market benefits such as unemployment compensation, welfare,
and social security. Given that the household planner takes government policy as
given, the differences in weights may be the result of differences in government policy
across countries, among other things. Allowing for endogenous weighting of employed
and non-employed individuals is beyond the scope of this paper, though future work
may include an option for weights to respond to changes in government policy.
The fixed cost to employment can include any number of costs that impact an
individuals decision to work. Past work has found that the manner in which the
government uses its revenue can have an important impact on the incentive to work
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(Ragan (2006) and Rogerson (2007)). For example, if the government were to sub-
sidize child care, as is the case in certain Scandanavian countries, then there would
be an increased incentive to substitute home production with market work (Shimer
(2009)). This lowered cost to entering the work force can be interpreted as a de-
crease in φ, as it makes working relatively more attractive. The degree to which the
government subsidizes market work over home production varies across countries, as
well as other differences impacting the decision to work, and can thus be captured
by differences in φ. The importance of both ψE and φ for understanding how policy
impacts trends in labor hours could warrant future research to focus on obtaining a
deeper understanding on the relationship between social programs within a country
and its respective parameter values.
Overall, this paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we highlight
the standard neoclassical model’s inability to predict long-run changes in the employ-
ment to population ratio. We show that the result is the model’s failure to accurately
predict long-run changes in hours per population for countries with large changes in
employment. Second, we develop a model that disentangles the choice between hours
per worker and employment per population in optimizing an economy’s overall labor
force. Thus, we allow for a better understanding of how policy changes can influence
aggregate behavior by separately analyzing both the extensive and intensive margin
of the labor supply response.
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4.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Neoclassical Model Generated Hours with Different ε































Notes.– Source of data used to create all figures and tables come from The Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre (www.ggdc.net), the Source OECD Database (www.sourceoecd.org), and the Penn World tables
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu). The tax data calculated in McDaniel (2007) is available at (www.caramcdaniel.com).
A more detailed description of the data can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.2: Actual Data on Hour per Population versus Neoclassical Model Predicted Hours
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Figure 4.3: Labor Wedge from Neoclassical Model

















Figure 4.4: Actual Data on Hour per Population versus Neoclassical Model with Taxes
Predicted Hours
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Figure 4.5: The NM Wedge and the NMT Wedge
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Figure 4.6: Hours Per Worker and Employment to Population’s Contribution to Hours Per
Population
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Figure 4.7: Actual Hours Per Worker and the Neoclassical Model with Taxes Prediction for H/E
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Figure 4.8: Actual Hours per Population and Hybrid Hours per Population
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Figure 4.9: The Neoclassical Model with Taxes Wedge and the E/P ratio
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Figure 4.10: Actual Hours Per worker and Our Model’s Predictions, Canada




















Figure 4.11: Actual Hours Per worker and Our Model’s Predictions, France
















Figure 4.12: Actual Hours Per worker and Our Model’s Predictions, Germany
















Figure 4.13: Actual Hours Per worker and Our Model’s Predictions, US



















Table 4.1: Data Description of Consumption to Output Ratio, 1960-2004
Mean St Dev Min Max
Australia 0.56 0.02 0.52 0.59
Austria 0.58 0.01 0.56 0.61
Belgium 0.55 0.02 0.52 0.59
Canada 0.57 0.02 0.52 0.62
Finland 0.49 0.02 0.46 0.53
France 0.56 0.01 0.55 0.58
Germany 0.58 0.02 0.54 0.61
Italy 0.55 0.02 0.49 0.59
Japan 0.51 0.02 0.48 0.57
Netherlands 0.53 0.02 0.50 0.58
Spain 0.57 0.02 0.54 0.61
Sweden 0.55 0.02 0.50 0.59
Switzerland 0.57 0.01 0.54 0.60
UK 0.61 0.02 0.57 0.66
US 0.67 0.01 0.64 0.70
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Table 4.2: Hours per worker 1960-2004: Actual Data vs. Model with Non-Employment (mean
percent change)
Model with Non-Employment
Country Actual ψE = 0.01 ψE = 0.25 ψE = 0.5 ψE = 0.75 ψE = 0.99
Australia -0.226 -0.571 -0.370 -0.238 -0.148 -0.085
Austria -0.715 0.328 -0.067 -0.296 -0.441 -0.539
Belgium -0.810 -0.546 -0.537 -0.529 -0.523 -0.518
Canada -0.281 -1.190 -0.751 -0.438 -0.208 -0.038
Finland -0.406 0.577 -0.045 -0.371 -0.569 -0.697
France -0.795 -0.507 -0.527 -0.542 -0.553 -0.562
Germany -0.921 -0.196 -0.368 -0.491 -0.579 -0.644
Italy -0.771 -0.753 -0.774 -0.790 -0.803 -0.812
Japan -0.496 -0.249 -0.229 -0.218 -0.211 -0.207
Netherlands -0.961 -1.657 -1.189 -0.876 -0.657 -0.500
Spain -0.355 -0.171 -0.168 -0.167 -0.165 -0.164
Sweden -0.381 -0.616 -0.590 -0.575 -0.567 -0.561
Switzerland -0.449 -0.495 -0.344 -0.285 -0.254 -0.236
UK -0.634 -0.421 -0.422 -0.422 -0.422 -0.423
US -0.204 -0.889 -0.613 -0.426 -0.296 -0.203
Mean -0.560 -0.490 -0.466 -0.444 -0.427 -0.413
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Table 4.3: 1960-2004 actual E/P and Model with Non-Employment φt mean percent change
Model with Non-Employment φt
Country Actual E/P ψE = 0.01 ψE = 0.25 ψE = 0.5 ψE = 0.75 ψE = 0.99
Australia 0.193 -0.630 -0.286 -0.282 -0.281 -0.280
Austria -0.308 -1.720 -0.904 -0.894 -0.891 -0.889
Belgium 0.014 -1.784 -1.022 -1.013 -1.010 -1.008
Canada 0.508 -0.740 -0.356 -0.352 -0.351 -0.350
Finland -0.413 -0.918 -0.513 -0.507 -0.505 -0.504
France -0.026 -1.815 -1.004 -0.994 -0.990 -0.989
Germany -0.195 -2.206 -1.164 -1.151 -1.147 -1.146
Italy -0.028 -1.757 -0.974 -0.964 -0.961 -0.960
Japan 0.014 -1.176 -0.627 -0.620 -0.618 -0.617
Netherlands 0.478 -2.447 -1.214 -1.201 -1.197 -1.196
Spain 0.003 -0.896 -0.450 -0.444 -0.442 -0.441
Sweden 0.019 -0.986 -0.482 -0.476 -0.474 -0.474
Switzerland 0.062 -1.186 -0.568 -0.562 -0.560 -0.559
UK -0.001 -1.511 -0.801 -0.793 -0.790 -0.789
US 0.283 -0.622 -0.259 -0.255 -0.253 -0.253
Mean 0.040 -1.360 -0.708 -0.700 -0.698 -0.697
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Table 4.4: 1960-2004 actual and model mean percent changes
Actual NMT Model with Non-Employment
Country H/P H/E E/P H/P Rel. H/P Rel. H/E H/E Rel. H/E
Australia -0.032 -0.226 0.193 -0.083 2.595 0.369 -0.238 1.055
Austria -1.023 -0.715 -0.308 -0.542 0.530 0.759 -0.539 0.754
Belgium -0.796 -0.810 0.014 -0.518 0.650 0.639 -0.546 0.674
Canada 0.227 -0.281 0.508 -0.031 -0.139 0.112 -0.208 0.741
Finland -0.819 -0.406 -0.413 -0.702 0.857 1.730 -0.371 0.915
France -0.821 -0.795 -0.026 -0.562 0.685 0.707 -0.562 0.707
Germany -1.116 -0.921 -0.195 -0.647 0.579 0.702 -0.644 0.700
Italy -0.799 -0.771 -0.028 -0.813 1.017 1.054 -0.774 1.004
Japan -0.482 -0.496 0.014 -0.207 0.429 0.417 -0.249 0.502
Netherlands -0.483 -0.961 0.478 -0.494 1.022 0.514 -0.876 0.912
Spain -0.352 -0.355 0.003 -0.164 0.466 0.462 -0.171 0.480
Sweden -0.362 -0.381 0.019 -0.560 1.547 1.471 -0.561 1.472
Switzerland -0.388 -0.449 0.062 -0.235 0.607 0.524 -0.495 1.102
UK -0.635 -0.634 -0.001 -0.423 0.666 0.666 -0.423 0.666
US 0.080 -0.204 0.283 -0.203 -2.552 0.997 -0.203 0.997
Mean -0.520 -0.560 0.040 -0.412 0.597 0.741 -0.457 0.845
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4.9 Appendix A: Data Sources and Summary
All of the data is yearly. Data on hours per worker H/E and employment E are
from The Groningen Growth and Development Centre (www.ggdc.net). This data
is used to back out total hours H. Data on working-age population P is taken from
the Source OECD Database (www.sourceoecd.org), and data on consumption C and
output Y are from the Penn World tables (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu). The Mc-
Daniel (2007) tax data is available at (www.caramcdaniel.com), and is derived using
similar methods as in Mendoza et al. (1994). All of the data we use is summarized
in Tables (a) through (g) over the period 1960-2006 for the 15 OECD for which the
McDaniel (2007) tax series is available.
Table a: H/P summary statistics 1960-2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 1226 36.57 1128 1283
Austria 1253 181.91 1019 1605
Belgium 1070 149.01 916 1389
Canada 1206 46.176 1125 1305
Finland 1339 178.01 1051 1675
France 1165 161.80 974 1416
Germany 1131 187.35 910 1489
Italy 1034 133.82 908 1420
Japan 1474 82.08 1327 1648
Netherlands 1077 108.94 944 1291
Spain 1076 169.83 841 1296
Sweden 1250 57.10 1177 1395
Switzerland 1409 105.51 1287 1616
UK 1263 134.42 1111 1517
US 1266 57.38 1159 1375
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Table b: H/E summary statistics 1960-2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 1818 44.773 1751 1945
Austria 1762 178.25 1495 2073
Belgium 1802 194.15 1603 2289
Canada 1858 82.562 1760 2040
Finland 1868 115.31 1719 2074
France 1857 227.58 1532 2227
Germany 1736 224.57 1438 2163
Italy 1783 186.17 1590 2234
Japan 2054 142.50 1786 2224
Netherlands 1680 228.67 1399 2135
Spain 1954 134.85 1737 2137
Sweden 1648 116.76 1508 1900
Switzerland 1719 127.74 1551 1936
UK 1810 162.42 1614 2134
US 1854 62.76 1782 1981
Table c: E/P summary statistics 1960-2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 0.67 0.02 0.63 0.71
Austria 0.70 0.03 0.66 0.77
Belgium 0.59 0.02 0.54 0.62
Canada 0.65 0.04 0.57 0.72
Finland 0.71 0.05 0.59 0.81
France 0.62 0.02 0.59 0.65
Germany 0.64 0.03 0.60 0.69
Italy 0.57 0.02 0.55 0.63
Japan 0.71 0.02 0.68 0.75
Netherlands 0.64 0.05 0.59 0.76
Spain 0.54 0.06 0.45 0.61
Sweden 0.76 0.04 0.71 0.83
Switzerland 0.81 0.03 0.76 0.87
UK 0.69 0.02 0.64 0.72
US 0.68 0.04 0.62 0.74
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Table d: Y/P summary statistics 1960-2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 32269 8148 19429 49697
Austria 32351 9816 14925 48353
Belgium 30970 9202 14802 47030
Canada 33540 7665 20811 49010
Finland 26785 8110 13961 42984
France 31117 8342 15438 44959
Germany 33398 8391 17778 47212
Italy 27679 8694 12497 41902
Japan 28541 10905 8613 43757
Netherlands 32723 8029 19486 47891
Spain 24291 7710 9235 38675
Sweden 31442 7177 18253 45455
Switzerland 42195 6839 27555 51676
UK 28964 8086 17305 45697
US 41187 10705 24672 61156
Table e: C/P summary statistics 1960–2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 17881 3952 11428 26628
Austria 18684 5565 8541 26976
Belgium 16869 4804 8737 24531
Canada 18906 3587 12848 26088
Finland 13129 3897 6790 20615
France 17589 4733 8651 25545
Germany 19695 5580 9595 28379
Italy 15476 5167 6156 23536
Japan 14585 5549 4904 22950
Netherlands 17378 3956 9832 24429
Spain 13798 4054 5672 21159
Sweden 16990 3216 10740 22841
Switzerland 23828 3764 15734 29051
UK 17851 5639 10592 29735
US 27739 7585 16325 42632
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Table f: C/Y summary statistics 1960-2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 1.79 0.06 1.68 1.91
Austria 1.73 0.03 1.63 1.79
Belgium 1.83 0.05 1.69 1.91
Canada 1.76 0.07 1.58 1.91
Finland 2.03 0.07 1.87 2.17
France 1.77 0.02 1.71 1.82
Germany 1.71 0.07 1.63 1.85
Italy 1.80 0.08 1.70 2.04
Japan 1.94 0.07 1.75 2.07
Netherlands 1.87 0.07 1.72 1.98
Spain 1.74 0.05 1.62 1.84
Sweden 1.83 0.08 1.69 1.99
Switzerland 1.77 0.04 1.65 1.85
UK 1.63 0.06 1.52 1.75
US 1.49 0.03 1.42 1.56
Table g: (1− τ) summary statistics 1960–2006
Country Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 0.77 0.04 0.73 0.84
Austria 0.54 0.06 0.47 0.67
Belgium 0.53 0.08 0.44 0.69
Canada 0.70 0.05 0.63 0.80
Finland 0.55 0.09 0.41 0.73
France 0.52 0.06 0.44 0.62
Germany 0.54 0.05 0.48 0.64
Italy 0.58 0.07 0.49 0.69
Japan 0.75 0.06 0.67 0.82
Netherlands 0.51 0.06 0.43 0.68
Spain 0.66 0.08 0.51 0.76
Sweden 0.48 0.08 0.37 0.68
Switzerland 0.79 0.04 0.73 0.86
UK 0.63 0.03 0.59 0.73
US 0.74 0.02 0.71 0.79
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4.10 Appendix B: Derivations
Normalize all variables by Pt, and let et = Et/Pt and ct = Ct/Pt. First, consider
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where the last line follows from applying dx/x = d log (x).
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Therefore, the relevant two equations in the two ”unknowns” d log (et) and d log (ht)
are































d log φt (4.18)
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and
d log (ht) =
(
−ψN






d log (1− τt) +
ε
1 + ε
d log (Yt/Ct) .
(4.19)
Insert (4.19) in (4.18):
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(d log (1− τt) + d log (Yt/Ct)) .
Now, insert (4.18) in (4.19):
d log (ht) = −
(
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After simplifying and rearranging, this yields(
1 +
ψNψE
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d log (1− τt) +
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d log (Yt/Ct) .
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
This dissertation provided an empirical investigation into how tax policy impacts
behavior. One of my key findings was that unintended incentives from tax policy can
impact an individual’s behavior, while the intended incentives can fail to generate
a response. This is illustrated in the first essay, which analyzed a tax credit given
to low and middle income households for contributing to a retirement savings plan.
The policy creates a notch, or discontinuous jump, within a household’s budget
constraint that creates an incentive to misreport income. I found that individuals
responded to the incentive to misreport income, yet they failed to increase retirement
contributions, the intended goal of the program.
A second finding of this dissertation is that taxation can have an impact on
market wage rates. Specifically, past empirical studies often assume that pre-tax
wage rates are unchanged when changes are made to marginal tax rates. The second
essay, co-written with Matthew Rutledge, found the contrary to be true. We tested
whether marginal tax rates are related to pre-tax wage rates using evidence drawn
from changes made during the Tax Reform Act of 1986. We found that the net-of-
tax rate is negatively associated with pre-tax wages, which implies that marginal tax
rates indeed have an impact on pre-tax wage rates.
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A third finding of this dissertation is that tax policy impacts the overall econ-
omy through margins that the standard neoclassical model is unable to capture. In
the the third essay, co-written with Brendan Epstein, we showed that the standard
neoclassical model with taxes is a better predictor of hours per worker due to its
inability to accurately generate hours changes on the extensive margin. We then de-
veloped a model that allows both hours per worker and employment per population
to vary. We found that the impact taxes have on individuals’ decisions to work can
be better understood at an aggregate level when the hours decision is separated into
an intensive and an extensive margin.
Overall, this dissertation offered empirical evidence to foster a better understand-
ing of the specific impacts of taxation analyzed using both a micro- and macroe-
conomic framework. Each essay tested an aspect of economic theory as it applies
to problems in public finance. Throughout this dissertation I contributed empirical
analyses that provided insight into areas where previous empirical work had been
sparse. These findings introduced evidence to help shed light on the role tax policy
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